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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND APPEALS
By

WILLIAM

H.

ERICKSON*

Justice is no longer delayed in the Supreme Court of Colorado.
The court's departmental method of determining cases has made it
possible for oral argument to be held within three months after
issue is formed by the briefs in nearly every case. In 1961, 354 opinions were rendered by the court. Many of the controversies which
existed in the interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure have
now been resolved. This article will review the cases which altered
or changed the court's interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure, but will necessarily be limited due to the number of cases
which appeared before the court and involved the interpretation
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULE 4

The invalidity of a summons issued by an attorney pursuant
to Rule 4 (b), and not signed by him was the primary issue in Brown
v. Amen.1 A default judgment was taken against Brown, set aside
on Brown's motion, and then reinstated when a rehearing was held.
Brown and a witness called by him were found to be in contempt
at the time the default was reinstated. The supreme court, in reviewing the validity of the default judgment and the contempt
order, presumed that the copy of the summons served on Brown was
not signed, because the original summons admittedly was not
signed. Brown's appearance and motion to set aside the default
judgment granted jurisdiction over the person, which supported the
trial court's imposition of a sentence for contempt. However, it
failed to have the retroactive force which would allow the reinstatement of the default and merely granted the court jurisdiction
to set a time for Brown to plead or answer. The service of the void
summons was held by the court to be ineffective to bring the defendants within the jurisdiction of the court, and the default judgment was therefore set aside.
RULE 9

Lamberson v. Thomas, 2 was a quiet title action where the defendant successfully proved title to mineral rights under a condemnation decree which awarded title to the defendant's predecessor
in interest. Rule 9 (e) came into play when a general denial formed
the plaintiff's basis for questioning the validity of the condemnation decree upon which the defendant relied to prove superior title.
After quoting Rule 9 (e), the court said:
If there were grounds upon which the condemnation
decree could be assailed, the plaintiff was in no position
to do it. Her "Reply to Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim" was only a general denial of the second, third and
* Member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Ass'ns and of the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson and
Meyer.
1 364 P.2d 735 (Colo. 1961).
2 362 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961).
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fourth defenses of defendants' amendment to answer. A
general denial of the validity of the decree is not sufficient
to assail it. Rule 9 (e) provides:
"In pleading a judgment or decision of a court ***
it is sufficient to aver [it] without setting forth matter
showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity
and when so made the party pleading the judgment
or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted
jurisdictional facts."
The above manner of pleading is prescribed not only
to simplify the pleadings relating to judgments, but also to
apprise the pleader of a judgment or decision of a court
that it is being challenged, for jurisdictional reasons as well
as the particular grounds of the attack upon it; and for the
further purpose of preventing final judgments and decisions of courts from being overthrown unadvisedly.
[I]f the plaintiff intended to attack the decree upon
jurisdictional grounds she was required to give notice to
the defendants by specifically denying jurisdiction and alleging with particularity the grounds showing lack of jurisdiction. Under the present system of pleading, the mandatory provisions of Rule 9(e) are not waived by the first
pleader's having alleged jurisdictional facts in support of
a judgment or decree. Contrary rulings by this court under
the former code practice
and procedure are no longer au3
thority in Colorado.
RULE 9 (b)
The plaintiff in Roblek v. Horst,4 was not permitted to retain
possession of a Cadillac which he had obtained by a writ of replevin
when he sought to defend his possession on the ground that he had
been fraudulently induced to release his chattel mortgage on the
Cadillac. In holding that the plaintiff failed to establish his defense
of fraud, the court said:
Fraud was neither pleaded nor proved in the manner
and with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), Colo.
R.C.P. and Ginsberg v. Zagar, 126 Colo. 536, 251 P.2d 1080.
The trial court under the present record was correct in directing a verdict for Frazer and against Roblek for possession of the Cadillac. There was no issue of fact to be resolved by the jury, but only an issue of law to be resolved
by the court.5
RULE

9 (e)

Rule 9(e) again found its way before the court in Superior
Distributing Corp. v. White,6 where full faith and credit was given
to a judgment entered in Mississippi. The defendants had appeared
specially in the Mississippi courts to quash the service and, after
a hearing, were granted time to plead or answer when their motion
was denied. When the Mississippi judgment was placed at issue in
Colorado, the defendants alleged fraud in its procurement. The su3 Id. at 183.
4 362 P.2d 869 (Colo. 1961).
5 Id. at 873.
6362 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1961).
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preme court, in sustaining the judgment, held that the jurisdictional
facts alleged as fraud were those litigated and decided by the Mississippi courts and were not subject to collateral attack. The defendants elected not to appear after the adverse determination on
their motion to quash and were thereafter foreclosed from questioning the same facts in the Colorado court.
RULE

30

In Appelhans v. Kirkwood,' a $10,000 judgment was entered in
favor of a fourteen-year-old plaintiff who was injured while occupying the defendant's automobile as a guest. In cross-examination of
the plaintiff, defense counsel attempted to use a pre-trial discovery
deposition in laying a foundation for impeachment. Objection was
made to the form of the question. It was then discovered that the
deposition had been corrected but not signed by the plaintiff and
had not been returned to the reporter to be certified and filed as
required by Rule 30(f). The court suppressed the deposition, even
though the plaintiff had consented to its use. The supreme court
held that the trial court violated Rule 32 (d) in that any irregularity
in the manner in which the deposition is "signed, certified, sealed
...filed, or otherwise dealt with by the officer under Rules 30 and
31 are waived unless a motion to suppress the deposition, or some
part of it, is made with reasonable promptness or with due diligence
might have been ascertained." The court also found error in the
trial court's denial of the right to refer to the deposition for the
purpose of impeachment and said that the inadmissibility of the
deposition was not put in issue until such time as the defendants
proposed to impeach the witness by introducing the deposition into
evidence. In strongly criticizing the trial court's action, the court
reviewed the right to the use of a deposition and said:
The court's subsequent action in suppressing the deposition, despite agreement by counsel for plaintiff that it be
admitted for a limited purpose, was palpably erroneous.
Defendants were entitled to refer to the deposition or any
other document which would serve to bring to the attention
of the witness any prior statement which she made looking
to ultimate impeachment. The question of the inadmissibility of the deposition was not a valid issue until such time
as the defendants proposed to impeach the witness by introducing the deposition. Until then it was not admissible in
evidence. Our practice, unlike that under the Federal rules,
does not permit its introduction as an admission.8
RULE 36
In McGee v. Heim,9 the plaintiff sought to recover for damages
suffered in a fire allegedly caused by the defendant's acts. The
plaintiff filed Requests for Admissions which the defendant failed
to answer. The trial judge allowed the defendant to rebut his admission as to the cause of the fire with testimony, which allowance
was sustained by the supreme court:
7 365 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id at 238.
S#362 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1961).
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In Beasley v. United States (D.C.E.D.S.C. 1948), 81 F.
"Supp. 518, 528, it was held in interpreting the equivalent
federal rule on this point that "The admissions or denials
stand in the same relation to the case that sworn evidence
bears." This does not mean, however, that a technical admission of a certain fact will prevail over uncontradicted
evidence to the contrary.
It would seem, then, that the proper effect of such an
admission would be of a purely evidential nature. It may
be contradicted or10 rebutted, its ultimate worth being left
to the trier of fact.
RULE

37 (c)

In Superior Distributing Corp. v. White," defendant refused
to make certain admissions under Rule 36 and forced the plaintiff
to take depositions, which the trial court refused to tax as costs
against the defendant. On writ of error the trial court was sustained
when the supreme court held that the awarding of costs under Rule
37 (c) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.
RULES 38 AND 39
In a unique personal injury action, Butters v. Wann,12 Rule 38
was again placed before the court for interpretation when the defendants failed to make a timely demand for a jury trial. The court,
despite the defendants' failure to comply with Rule 38 and Rule 39,
ordered a jury trial. The defendants' demand for a jury was made
more than a year after the issues were formed. The court, relying
on Jaynes v. Marrow,13 said that it was the trial court's right and
power to order a jury trial, despite the fact that the formal requirements of Rule 38 were not complied with.
a In Rupp v. Cool,14 the court defined and clarified the right to
a jury trial in the district court after trial to the court in the county
court. The action was for the collection of attorney's fees and was
tried to the court, where judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
On appeal to the district court, the defendant sought a jury, and
the right was denied. In reversing, the supreme court said:
The trial in the district court being de novo it seems
reasonable and just that the parties should not be bound in
10 Id. at 196.
11 Supra note 6.
12 363 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1961).
13 144 Colo. 138, 355 P.2d 529 (1960).
14 362 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1961).
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the district court by their demanding or failing to demand
a jury trial in the county court.
We hold that either party on appeal from the county
court to the district court should be entitled to a jury trial
in the district court in actions set forth in Rule 38. The rule
does not specifically cover the time within which demand
for jury trial should be made in cases appealed from the
county court to the district court. Under these circumstances, if the demand for jury trial in such cases is made
within a reasonable time prior to trial, and the trial court,
under Rule 40, R.C.P. Colo., is afforded an oppportunity to
arrange its trial calendar in an expeditious manner, the
request for jury trial should be granted. 15
The court, however, refused to place the trial of an annulment
action within the confines of Rule 38 (a) in Young v. Colorado Nat'l
Bank,16 and said that a cursory reading of the rule forces the conclusion that an annulment suit does not come within the meaning
of the actions enumerated in Rule 38 (a). The famous Young case
was one where both parties consented to a jury trial, and the court
elected to treat the jury as an "advisory jury." The supreme court
determined that an annulment action was a statutory action in
which the court is clothed with equity powers. In analyzing the
right to trial by jury in an annulment action, the court looked to
Rule 39 (c) and said:
It is to be observed that the headnote and the body of
the rule refer to two kinds of trials. 1. Cases not triable by
a jury may, on motion or on the court's own initiative, be
tried with an "advisory jury." 2. Non-jury cases including
non-jury statutory actions (with an exception not pertinent
here) may, by consent of court and the parties, be tried
with a "jury." In the first, an "advisory jury" acts; in the
second, a "jury" acts. If it had been intended that the "trial
by consent" be submitted to an "advisory jury," the rule
would have so stated.
This rule takes care of two differing situations. In the
first, a party may request that a non-jury case be tried to a
jury and the adversary party may resist. In such case, the
court may grant the request but, since it has been resisted,
may use the services of the jury in an advisory capacity
only. In the second, parties and court consenting, the jury's
verdict has the effect of a common law verdict.
As we construe Rule 39 (c), the trial of a non-jury action to a jury, with the consent of both parties and the
judge, is a jury trial in its regular sense.
Where the plaintiff demands a jury trial of a non-jury
case and neither the defendant nor the court objects, consent to such trial is deemed to have been given, and the
jury's verdict has "the same effect as if a jury trial had
been a matter of right." Kelly v. Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp., 171 F.2d 909, cert. den. 337 U.S. 917. The unilateral
act of the trial court in changing the case from one of trial
15 Id. at 399.
16 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).
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by consent to one in which an advisory verdict would be
received was error; such change could only have been 7accomplished by agreement of the parties and the court.'
The Young case also caused the court to examine Rule 43(b)
when the right to call Young's attorney as an adverse witness for
cross-examination was before the court. The court said:
The relationship of attorney and client does not entitle
the opposing party to call the attorney under Rule 43(b),
R.C.P. Colo., to propound leading questions to him as an
adverse party or witness. Bankers Trust Co. v. International
Trust Co., 108 Colo. 15, 113 P.2d 656. Conduct of the attorney
in extraneous matters, evincing an opinion on his part that
his client is mentally competent, cannot, under the circumstances here present, be the subject of interrogation by calling the attorney as witness as tending lo prove the competency of his client in a suit between the latter and another."
RULE 41
A real estate broker brought a contract action against a purchaser of property to recover an amount overpaid or erroneously
credited to the purchaser in the real estate closing sheet which he
prepared, and his action was dismissed without prejudice for lack
of privity. The broker instituted a second action in quasi contract
and obtained judgment against the defendant. On writ of error the
defendant urged that the trial court erred by not sustaining his
defense of res judicata. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
decision and held that the dismissal by the trial court in the first
instance was without prejudice and that Rule 41(b) did not foreclose the plaintiff from bringing his subsequent action in quasi
contract. 19
RULE 49
In the oft decided case of O'Brien v. Wallace,2' the issues which
had been joined and tried in a will contest were again presented
to the court for review. Admission of the will to probate was opposed on the ground that the will was not properly executed and
for the further reason that the testator did not have the requisite
mental capacity at the time of execution. Proof of execution was
offered and not contradicted, although abundant evidence was offered to show the mental incompetency of testator. Both issues were
submitted to the jury, and a general verdict was returned invalidating the will. In reversing, the court held that error had been
committed in not directing a verdict in favor of the proponents of
the will on the issue of execution and said that the error had been
compounded by having the jury return a general verdict. The court
said:
A general verdict upon distinct issues raised by several
pleas cannot be sustained if one of the issues should not
have been submitted to the jury. Here we have no way of
knowing upon which of the issues submitted the jury
reached its conclusion. It may have decided that Mary A.
17 Id. at 7C8.
11. Id. at 709.
191 Wnstrcnd v. Leach Realty Co., 364 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1961).
20 359 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1961).
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Paige was competent but that the will was improperly executed, such verdict could not stand for there was 2no
testi1
mony to sustain a finding of improper execution.
RULE 50

In Nettrour v. J. C. Penney Co., 22 the supreme court reversed

the trial court which had granted a directed verdict in favor of the
defense. The directed verdict was granted in an action involving
injuries sustained by a five-year-old boy while he was riding the
escalator in the defendant's store. In analyzing the duties owed to
a business invitee and the evidence presented, the court reversed
and remanded and again said that a motion for a directed verdict
could be granted only where the evidence compels the conclusion
that the minds of reasonable men could not be in disagreement. The
evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and a motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when no
evidence has been presented, and no inference could be drawn from
2

Id. at 1030.

22 360 P .2d 964 (Colo. 1961).

NOW. .,A SERVANT'S
IN

:2

er

ENTRANCE

c8ome

You no longer have to be wealthy
to afford a private servant. In spite of
spiraling costs in nearly every phase of modern living,
electricity, the most powerful servant of the century,
remains well within reach of everyone's household budget.
.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO

DICTA

MAY-JUNE,

1962

the evidence before the court, which would allow a jury verdict
against the moving party to stand.
In a wrongful death action, Sniezek v. Cimino,"3 a verdict was
directed against the plaintiff and affirmed by the supreme court,
because the evidence posed no factual theory upon which the jury
could have found negligence on the part of the defendants. The
plaintiff had also urged that the trial court erred in not submitting
an instruction which had been tendered and in allowing certain
cross-examination. The supreme court affirmed the directed verdict
with allusion to Rule 118 (f), which requires the court to "disregard
any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties."
RULE

52

The findings made by the trial court pursuant to Rule 52 were
questioned in Anderson Randolph, Inc. v. Taylor,24 and Crain v.
Electrical Workers' Benefit Ass'n.2 5 The supreme court repeated the
established law that findings of a trial court are binding and conclusive on review, unless the evidence is wholly insufficient to susstain them.
In an action to recover damages for failure to include an easement in a title insurance policy covering business property, the
defendant insurer sought to set aside the trial court's findings on
the basis that the judgment was based on the wrong grqund. The
supreme court answered the argument with the rule that "if a trial
court announces the wrong grounds or incomplete grounds for its
decision, nevertheless if proper grounds do exist therefor in the
record that it will be affirmed on review. '2 6 However, a contract
action, Murray v. Rock,27 was reversed and remanded for new trial
because of incomplete findings of fact and because the case could
not be remanded for appropriate findings of fact after the trial
judge had retired. In holding that the findings were insufficient to
comply with Rule 52, the court repeated that findings may be either
oral or written, but must be so explicit as to give the appellate
court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision
and to enable the appellate court to determine the ground on which
28
it reached its decision.
In Dollison v. Cook, -9 the trial court found for the plaintiff and
awarded damages for breach of an oral construction contract, but
failed to make a specific finding with regard to each objection made
by. the defendant. In affirming, the supreme court said there was no
competent evidence to support the findings of the trial court and
refused to reverse for failure to make specific findings.
RULE 54
In Morrissey v. Achziger 3 0 the plaintiff instituted a quiet title
action naming several defendants, and all defendants were personally served. Morrissey, who was a defendant, filed a cross-claim
against the defendant Burns seeking reformation of his deed from
23 360 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1961).

24 361 P.2d 142 (Colo. 1961).
25 361 P.2d 442 (Colo. 1961).
26 Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Trieder, 362 P.2d 555, 557 (Colo. 1961).

27 364 P.2d 393 (Colo. 1961).
28 See also In re Peterson's Estate, 365 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1961).

29 364 P.2d 207 (Colo. 1961).
30 364 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1961).
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Burns, but never caused service of the cross-claim to be made on
Burns. Burns defaulted and the supreme court upheld the plaintiff's
judgment, but refused to countenance the entry of a default on
Morrissey's cross-claim. The supreme court held that Burns had not
received notice of Morrissey's cross-claim and that jurisdiction did
not exist which would support a valid judgment for reformation
under Rule 54.
RULE

55

A default judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action
caused the supreme court to review not only Rule 55(b) but also
Rule 80 and Rule 98 (i), in Orebaugh v. Doskocil.31 A forcible entry
and detainer complaint was filed in the district court of Baca County, and a default judgment was entered by the court while sitting
at Lamar, in Prowers County. The court, in entering the default
judgment, took testimony which was not recorded by a court reporter and admitted five exhibits into evidence. The defendant filed
an answer after the default was taken and subsequently filed a
motion to set aside the default, alleging that the failure to answer
within the proper time was the result of excusable neglect arising
from mistake as to the time that service actually occurred. The trial
court refused to set aside the judgment. The supreme court affirmed, holding that excusable neglect was not a sufficient basis
for setting aside the default when not accompanied by a meritorious
defense. The defendant's answer admitted the facts necessary to
justify a judgment for forcible entry and detainer. The supreme
court also pointed out that a trial court has wide discretion in a
forcible entry and detainer action, where possession alone is in
issue, as to whether a hearing is necessary before entering a default,
and that Rule 80, which requires that evidence be taken stenographically, yielded and did not dictate a mandatory procedure in the
taking of default judgments under Rule 55(b). The defendant's
contention that error was committed by the entry of a judgment in
Prowers, rather than Baca County, was also held to be without
merit under Rule 98 (i), because the action was filed in the county
having proper venue and was held for the convenience of counsel
in Prowers County only after the defendant had defaulted.
RULE 56
Res judicata was held to be a valid basis for a summary judgment under Rule 56 in Kaminsky v. Kaminsky.32 The plaintiff
sought to question a divorce decree which had been entered in her
husband's favor while she was a mental incompetent and also requested an accounting of past and future support money, property
held by the husband for her account, and for the creation of a trust
relating to the property in issue. The husband's lawyer filed an affidavit which incorporated a copy of the Interlocutory and Final
Decrees of Divorce in favor of the husband, in support of his motion
for a summary judgment. He also moved to dismiss the wife's claim
for an accounting on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. In affirming the summary judgment,
the supreme court again held that res judicata can be raised in a
31359 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1961).
32 359 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1961).
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motion for summary judgment and upheld the attorney's affidavit
which had certified copies of the judgment of the county court attached to it as being in full compliance with Rule 56 (e). The court,
however, reversed the trial court for dismissing the wife's suit for
equitable relief, including an accounting.
A summary judgment under Rule 56 has seldom been sustained
by the supreme court. Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc.,33 upheld a
summary judgment which had been granted on the basis of the
affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's
claim was for commissions, and the sole issue was whether the defendant corporation had absented itself from the State of Colorado
so as to toll the statute of limitations. The supreme court, in upholding the trial judge's determination on the affidavits, said:
By the affidavits filed in support of the motion for summary judgment as provided in Rule 56, Colorado R.C.P., the
court had such facts before it as to enable it to determine
whether the defendant was present in the state for the purposes of service. The affidavit complied with Rule 56(e)
R.C.P. Colo., which provides in part that "*

* * shall be

made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. * * *"34
A summary judgment was also upheld in Broadway Roofing &
Supply, Inc. v. Cameron,35 when the record disclosed that a construction contract did not bind the purchasers of property. The facts
appearing before the court by way of affidavit established that
there was no issue as to any material fact, and the defendant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
RULE

59

Rule 59 was construed in several eases during 1961. In Boyd v.
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 6 the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and judgment of dismissal as to the defendant was entered.
Thereafter, the plaintiff successfully urged a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict when defense counsel failed to appear.
The supreme court refused to consider, as a motion for new trial,
the defendant's motion to reconsider the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50 (b). The court dismissed the
writ of error for failure to file a motion for a new trial in compliance with Rule 59 (f).
The $175,681 wrongful death verdict in the ubiquitous falling
telephone pole case was not reinstated by the supreme court after
a new trial was awarded by the trial court.37 The plaintiffs had attempted in the trial court to limit the issues on retrial to damages
alone and had sought to have the verdict reinstated in the supreme
court. In upholding the trial court, the supreme court held that an
original proceeding was not proper when an adequate review was
available by writ of error. The issues framed could not be determined in the supreme court without a record, and the matters be33 364 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
34 Ibid.
35 362 P.2d 393 (Cola. 1961).
36365 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1961).
37 Piper v. District Court, 364 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1961).
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fore the supreme court forced the conclusion that the trial court
was within its discretion in ordering a new trial.
Cortviendt v. Cortviendt s merely reiterated the truism that
Rule 59 serves as a prerequisite to review by writ of error, and the
court refused to honor the plaintiff's efforts to extend the period
for review with a motion to vacate under Rule 60 and held that a
valid judgment is not reviewable by writ of error. Of like effect is
Dry Cleaners & Laundry Workers v. Sunnyside Cleaners,311 where
the court summarily refused to consider grounds for reversal not
previously raised before the trial court and grounds not specified in
the motion for a new trial.
RULE 81

In Swingle v. Pollo's Estate,40 a beneficiary under a will appealed from the allowance of a claim against the estate from the
county court to the district court. The appeal was dismissed for
failure to file a bond in the district court within ten days and for
the further reason that the bond was insufficient in amount. The
bond in issue was filed late, but was approved by the judge of the
county court within the ten-day period, and, admittedly, the county
judge had the power to grant an extension of time for the filing and
approval of the bond. In attacking the insufficiency of the bond and
the timeliness of filing, no proof was offered to show the deficiency
of the bond. The supreme court upheld the sufficiency of the bond
and the timeliness of filing and declared that a beneficiary under
a will who appeals from the allowance of a claim need make only
a cost bond, and not a bond in twice the amount appealed from, and,
therefore, reversed and remanded for trial on the merits, since no
proof appeared in the record to show that the bond was deficient.
RULE 97
In Kovacheff v. Langhart,41 a failure to honor a motion to disqualify, which was supported by affidavits charging that the trial
judge disliked the plaintiff's attorney, was upheld by the supreme
court on the ground that facts did not appear which would justify
or compel disqualification of the trial judge.
RULE 101

The focal point of Grant v. Gwyn' 2 was the right to a body
execution which was issued in a brutal assault case. The defendant
moved to set aside the body execution, relying on Canon City v.
Merris,' 43 and claimed that the imposition of a sentence in the Municipal Court of Denver prohibited the imposition of execution against
the body of the defendant. The trial court had submitted the proper
interrogatory to the jury on the question of whether the defendant
was guilty of a willful and wanton disregard of the rights and safety
of the plaintiff and had properly instructed the jury on the issue of
exemplary damages. After a verdict was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, the trial court ordered that a body execution be issued.
The defendant's motion to set aside the body execution on the basis
:3x 361 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1961).
39 360 P.2d 446 (Colo. 1961).
40 360 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1961).

41 363 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1961).
42 365 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1961).
4:1 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958'.

DICTA

MAY-JUNE, 1962

of her conviction for assault in the municipal court was made after
the body execution was ordered, and the supreme court held that
the motion was in time under Rule 101 (a) because body execution
had not issued at the time the motion was filed.
RULE 103
In upholding a garnishment and the trial court's ruling on the
garnishee's traverse, in Field Family Constr. Co. v. Ryan,4 4 the supreme court said:
[W] here one, for a valuable consideration, has assumed
the obligation of another to plaintiff, he may be held liable

as garnishee ....

The assumption of the debts of another

when in proper form is a right, credit or chose in action
required to be reported 4in
garnishment proceedings under
5

Rule 103 (a), R.C.P. Colo.
In Loveland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co.,4 6 an attempt

was made to collect on a judgment for American Founders obtained
against Colorado Management Corporation, and execution was issued which was supported by a writ of garnishment. Pursuant to
the writ, Loveland delivered stock certificates in her possession to
the clerk and asserted a claim against the certificates and the Colorado Management Corporation. Error was asserted for failure to
require the garnishee's claim to be honored before the certificates
were released, and the supreme court dismissed the writ of error
because no final judgment was present for review.
In Rockey v. McCauley,47 error was predicated on the trial
court's dismissal of a traverse in a garnishment proceeding. The
right to set-off was in issue when Rockey attempted to enforce his
judgment against Klepping by serving a garnishee summons on
McCauley, who had suffered judgment in a suit instituted by Klepping against him. McCauley answered the garnishment by claiming
that he also held judgments against Klepping and was entitled to
set-off. Rockey traversed the answer, denying McCauley's ownership of the judgments at the time of the garnishment. Thereafter,
McCauley moved to dismiss the traverse and to have his set-off
approved in the action where Klepping had obtained his judgment,
and both motions were honored. On writ of error, the trial court
was reversed for failure to allow Rockey a hearing on his traverse
and for granting a set-off in favor of McCauley to Rockey's detriment in an action where Rockey was not a party. The supreme court
said that the rights became fixed and should have been determined
on the issues raised by the answer and traverse on the date that the
garnishee summons was served.
RULE 106
A. Certiorariand Mandamus
In Ahern v. Baker,48 the retail package liquor dealers sought by
declaratory judgment and mandamus to force the secretary of state
to carry out certain mandatory provisions of the liquor code dealing with home delivery of package liquor and prayed that the con44 360 P.2d
45 Ibid.
46 361 P.2d
47366 P.2d
48366 P.2d

110 (Colo. 1961).
967 (Colo. 1961).
138 (Colo. 1961).
366 (Colo. 1961).
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stitutionality of the liquor code be determined. The trial court dismissed the action, and the dismissal was upheld by the supreme
court when it found that there was no controversy and all the parties before the court were not present. In reviewing the matter, the
supreme court found that the complaint was insufficient to bring
the action within Rule 106, whether the proceeding be considered
as certiorari or mandamus. There were no proceedings before the
secretary of state for the court to review, and no complaint was
voiced which urged that the secretary had exceeded his jurisdiction,
and since the secretary of state had not acted, he could not have
abused his discretion. Mandamus also was not proper because no
clear legal right to demand the performance of an act was shown
or clear legal duty to act was established; therefore, the trial court's
dismissal was affirmed.
Middle of the night justice, as the supreme court designated the
action of a justice of the peace, was not in harmony with due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 9 Strohl was taken
before the justice court late at night, after having been involved
in an automobile collision, and charged with driving on the wrong
side of the road and under the influence of liquor. He pleaded guilty
and paid the fine on the representation that he could then go on
his way, but without disclosure of the fact that he faced the loss
of his driver's license by reason of his plea. Thereafter, he sought
relief in the district court under Rule 106(a)(4) in the nature of
certiorari. The district court held the proceedings before the justice
of the peace to be void, and on writ of error the supreme court upheld the propriety of the use of the extraordinary remedy and found
that Strohl had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. In
considering the propriety of taking evidence in the course of a hearing under writ of certiorari, the court recognized that although certiorari is a proceeding to review the proceedings in an inferior
tribunal, testimony may be taken on the issue of jurisdiction provided that no disputed questions of fact were determined. Accordingly, the case was remanded for a proper hearing in the justice of
the peace court.
A writ of mandamus did not take the place of a writ of error in
Mar-Lee Corp. v. Steele.50 The controversy before the court arose
when restrictive covenants on residential property were construed
49 Toland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961).
50 359 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1961).

KELLY GIRLS

o Skilled

o Tested

o Bonded

Experienced Office Girls to Meet All Law Office Needs
ON YOUR STAFF
IN COLORADO SPRINGS
MEirose 3-4659
MIDLAND BLDG.

ON OUR PAYROLL
*

IN DENVER
292-2920
240 Petroleum Club Bldg.

*

IN GREELEY
ELgin 2.5922
GREELEY BLDG.

DICTA

MAY-JUNE,

1962

to allow the construction of a church. The proceeding was commenced as a class action and service was not effected on all property
owners in the area affected by the covenants. The trial court refused
to recognize the proceeding as a class action within Rule 23 and
ordered that all persons be served if the action was to continue.
Thereafter, without a record, a petition for a writ of mandamus was
filed in the supreme court. The supreme court held that the petitioners could have obtained a dismissal by standing on the record
in the trial court and would thereby have made review possible
by writ of error. The petition for a writ of mandamus was improper,
because an adequate remedy was available by way of writ of error,
once the case was dismissed in the trial court.
B. Prohibition
5
The court issued a writ of prohibition in Lopez v. Smith, ' to
restrain a county court from hearing and determining a writ of
habeas corpus which was filed in aid of adoption proceedings. Smith
had custody of the disputed child for fourteen years and obtained
the child when the parents voluntarily relinquished the child to
him. The parents then took the child, and Smith looked to adoption
proceedings and a writ of habeas corpus in the county court to regain custody of the child. In upholding the parents' use of original
proceedings and prohibition in the supreme court, the record recognized Smith's equities and said:
Unquestionably habeas corpus is an available remedy
to adjudicate custody of children under certain circumstances. .

.

. But a stranger lacks standing to maintain

habeas corpus looking to an award of custody as against
parents of the child who are presumed to be entitled to the
custody.... One who seeks custody through
52 habeas corpus

must show a prima facie right to custody.
The court concluded that the county court lacked jurisdiction,
and the rule to show cause was made absolute.
Scheer v. District Court,5" brought a writ of prohibition before
the court when an attempt was made to prosecute a father under
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act after he had
successfully divorced his wife in Colorado and had obtained a decree
of divorce reserving the issue of child support and custody until
his wife returned his children to Colorado. The wife had the children in Nevada and brought suit under the Act. The supreme court
discharged the writ and held that. the divorce decree did not prohibit the district court from proceeding under the Act, since the
divorce decree did not exclude other remedies and the duties to
support the minor children were absolute and could be enforced
through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
In Rabinoff v. District Court,54 the supreme court reviewed the
constitutionality of the Urban Renewal Act and upheld the jurisdiction of the district court when original proceedings were instituted for review by certiorari or, in the alternative, for prohibition, to challenge the jurisdiction of the district court to hear con51 360 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1961).
52 Id. at 969.

53 363 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1961).
54360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1961).
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demnation proceedings which were instituted in connection with
the Urban Renewal Act. The constitutionality of the Act was upheld
and the rule to show cause was discharged.
RULE 107
In Wall v. District Court, 55 the supreme court upheld a fine
for contempt against an attorney, even though the record reflected
no conduct which was worthy of punishment. The court held that
the trial court's findings as to factual matters were conclusive and
directed attention to the inanimate record which the court felt did
not reflect demeanor, facial expressions, mannerisms, and other
conduct of the party which would not take the form of the printed
word.

RULE 111

Rule 111 furnished the basis for the dismissal of a writ of error
in Herzog v. Murad,56 after the plaintiff in a personal injury action
had successfully argued that an additur should be granted to the
jury verdict which had been returned in his favor. The trial court
granted the request for an additur and ordered that, if the defendant elected not to pay the additional sum ordered by the court, a
new trial would be held on the issue of damages alone. The defendant sought to review the ruling by writ of error but did not obtain
a final judgment in accordance with the trial court's ruling, and the
case was, therefore, dismissed without prejudice to the defendant
and with the full right to review the proceeding in the trial court
after final judgment was entered.
In England v. Colorado Agency Co.,5 7 the supreme court was

asked to review a temporary injunction and a sentence for contempt. No supersedeas was obtained from the supreme court, and
in affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme court
found the sentence for contempt to be supported by the record and
held that the mere issuance of the writ of error did not stay proceedings in the trial court.
Failure to obtain a final judgment resulted in dismissal of a
writ of error in Weaver v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. 58 The defendant's
unsuccessful argument to bring in third-party defendants in a mortgage foreclosure suit caused the matter to appear before the supreme court in the Weaver case. When the defendant's motion to
bring in third parties was denied, the defendant petitioned for a
writ of prohibition, and the writ was denied. Finally, the defendant
sued out a writ of error which also resulted in dismissal because
the supreme court ruled that the trial court's denial of the motion
to bring in third parties was not a final order subject to review by
writ of error.
A writ of error was also dismissed in Mason v. Benson, 9 when
the supreme court found that the writ of error was not sought in
apt time and that the parties who sought to review an adoption
proceeding were not parties to the action and had no standing before
the court.
55 360 P.2d
56363 P.2d
57 359 P.2d
58 360 P.2d
59 361 P.2d

452 (Colo. 1961).
645 (Colo. 1961).
I (Colo. 1961).
807 (Colo. 1961).
349 (Colo. 1961).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE VALIDITY OF URBAN RENEWAL IN COLORADO
By

HAROLD

E.

HURST*

This article is written to review the constitutional law and administrative law decisions of the Supreme Court of Colorado during
1961.
A reading of the 1961 decisions disclosed none that are classifiable as administrative law decisions. Most of the constitutional law
decisions were routine and not of much importance. Rather than
digest many cases with only routine significance, an election has
been made to confine comment to the one case which involved a
very difficult and important question and stirred vehement disagreement among the members of the court.
I.

URBAN

RENEWAL -

TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PRIVATE USE?

The case involved the highly controversial questions in the urban renewal litigation 1 which dispossessed property owners, and
resulted in clearing of properties of the then existing buildings, and
resale of most of the property by the Urban Renewal Authority to
private concerns for industrial and multiple unit housing uses.
The case arose as a result of the condemnation by the Urban
Renewal Authority of property of the plaintiffs, part of 150 acres of
property in west Denver. The project which gave rise to the case
is otherwise known as the Avondale Project, at the west end of the
Colfax Avenue viaduct, approximately one and one-half miles west
of the downtown business district of Denver.
The condemnation proceedings were commenced pursuant to
the Urban Renewal Act,2 authorizing cities, through Urban Renewal
Authorities, to condemn slum and blighted areas and to "redevelop"
such areas by sale to private individuals or corporations.
The plaintiff property owners resisted the condemnation actions
initiated by the Authority. The principal contention of the plaintiffs was that the Urban Renewal Law and the action taken thereunder by Denver and the Authority violated the state constitution
which provides limitations on state legislative authority as follows:
Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of
necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains,flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural,
mining,
3
milling, domestic or sanitary purposes.
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for
public or private use without just compensation. .

.

. and

whenever an attempt is made to take private property for
a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question,
and determined as such without4 regard to any legislative
assertion that the use is public.
* Dean of the University of Denver College of Low.
1 Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1961).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 139-62-1 to 139-62-14 (Supp. 1960).
3 Cola. Const. art. II, § 14. (Emphasis supplied.)
4Cola. Cons?, art. II, § 15. (Emphasis supplied.)
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A. Is Urban Renewal a Public or a Private Use?
In considering the principal question posed, the court said:
The narrow inquiry, therefore, is whether the power
of eminent domain can be exercised in circumstances such
as the present, wherein the public authority does not intend
to permanently retain the property which it proposes to
condemn. We do not consider the actual use by the public
after the taking to be the appropriatetest as to whether or
not the use is a public one. The main object of this legislation is to eliminate slum and blighted areas as defined
in the act. ...5

If the use to which property is to be put is not the "appropriate
test," then what is? And if "actual use by the public after the taking" is not the appropriate test, why does the Colorado Constitution 6 provide specifically that "whenever an attempt is made to take
private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question. ..."?

Analysis of the constitutional provisions7 makes it perfectly
clear that the people intended to and did establish the following
principles for the protection of property ownership:
1. Private property shall not be taken for either a public or a
private use without just compensation.
2. Private property shall not be taken for a private use except
for carefully specified purposes.
3. Whenever an attempt is made to take property for a use alleged to be public, the courts are to decide whether the use be really
public.
The only purpose which the last principle can serve is to determine if the contemplated use be public (in which case the constitution imposes no limit upon the purpose of the taking) or private
(in which case the constitution permits the taking only for certain
named purposes). Slum clearance and urban renewal are not permissible objects or purposes which will support taking private property for private use.
The foregoing consideration returns us to the question whether
the taking of private property, clearing it of improvements, and
selling the property to private developers, is a public use or a private use. There can be no doubt concerning the answer to this
question because it is manifest, on the face of the Urban Renewal
Act that the legislature, the city council and the Renewal Authority
intended to take the property for the sole purpose of distributing it
to other private owners.
An authority may sell, lease or otherwise transfer real
property or any interest therein acquired by it as a part of
an urban renewal project, for residential, recreational, commercial, industrial or other uses, or for public use .... 8
An authority may dispose of real property in an urban
renewal area to private persons ....9
5
6
,
8
9

Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114, 118 (Colo. 1961). (Emphasis supplied.)
Colo. Const. art. II, § 15.
Colo. Const. art. II, 1514, 15.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-62-6(1) (Supp. 1960).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-62-6(2) (Supp. 1960).
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An authority cannot undertake an urban renewal project unless the city council approves the project, which approval may be
given if the council finds that "the urban renewal plan will afford
maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the
municipality as a whole, for the rehabilitation or redevelopment of
the urban renewal area by private enterprise."'10
Language could not make it clearer that the legislative purpose
was not to take the lands for public use, but to take private property
from the owners and redistribute it to other private owners. Any
other meaning given to the language of the act does violence to the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used.
After determining that it does not consider the public use of the
property after its taking to be the appropriate test, the court says,
"The main object of this legislation is to eliminate slum and blighted areas as defined in the act,"" and "The acquisition and transfer
to private parties is a mere incident of the chief purpose of the act
which is rehabilitation of the area."'1 2 The court then cited numerous cases sustaining urban renewal acts in other states, and in the
United States Supreme Court, and of them said:
All of these cases emphasize that the acquisition of
properties and the elimination of their slum or blighted
character constitutes a public purpose; that what is involved is an urban reclamation project; and the fact that
when the redevelopment is achieved the properties are sold
to private individuals for the purpose of 3development does
not rob the taking of its public purpose.1
What the court has failed to perceive is that all legislation by
the General Assembly must be calculated to achieve a public purpose if it is to be valid. The question here is not whether a public
purpose is being achieved, but rather whether it is being achieved
by a taking for a public or a private use. The latter question won't
just go away and hide behind the blind and easy references to public purpose. We can only conclude that the court failed to carry
out its constitutional duty to decide the most important question
in the case.
The dissents 14 not only contain the more persuasive logic, but
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-62.7(4) (Supp. 1960). (Emphasis supplied.)
11 Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114, 118 (Colo. 1961).
12 Id. at 119.
13 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
14 Dissenting opinions were by Mr. Justice Moore, in which Mr. Justice Frantz and Chief Justice
Hall concurred, and by Mr. Justice Franti.
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also point out the dangers to the public inherent in the kind of judicial abdication indulged in by the bare majority in the Rabinoff
case.
The final blow to the dispossessed property owners was the
advertisement in the Sunday Denver Post 15 for June 17, 1962, for
sale by the Renewal Authority, of the lands which they had previously owned to private purchasers "for development."
B. The Eminent Domain Limitation in Colorado
In order to afford a better understanding of the nature and purpose of the Colorado eminent domain limitations, and of the confusion apparent in the cases which seems to have led the majority of
the Colorado court astray, it is appropriate to explore the historical
understanding of eminent domain prior to and at the time of the
adoption of the Colorado Constitution.
1. The Nature of the Power.-It is not necessary for our purpose to establish the origin of the power of eminent domain. But,
for a landmark in our consideration of the problem it seems that the
power had only begun to be discussed in England, and not at all in
the colonies, at about the time of the Jamestown and Plymouth
landings. 16 We are here more particularly concerned with the early
views as to what the power permitted governments to do by way
of taking private property.
. The raw, unlimited power of eminent domain

. . .

em-

braces all cases where, by authority of the State and for
the public good, the property of the individual is taken,
without l is consent, for the purpose of being devoted to
some particular use, either by the state itself or by a corporation, public or private, or by a private citizen. This
definition relates to the power of eminent
domain as it
7
exists unrestricted in the sovereign state.
The power of eminent domain, thus defined, is nothing more
nor less than a facet of the police power -the power to legislate
with regard to persons and their property to promote the public
health, welfare, safety and morals. Indeed, Judge Cooley defined
the power as "the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of a public nature
which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety,
necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand."18
In the modern edition of Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain,
as revised by Sackman and van Brunt, we find the power defined
as follows:
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take
property for public use without the owner's consent. This
definition expresses the meaning of the power in its irreducible terms:
(a) Power to take,
(b) Without the owner's consent,
(c) For the public use.
15
16
17
18

Denver Post, June 17, 1962, p. 6D, col. 6-8.
1 Nichols, Eminent Domain 40 (3rd ed. 1950).
Lewis, Eminent Domain in the United States 1-2 (3rd ed. 19091.
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 1110 (8th ed. 1927),
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All else that may be found in the numerous definitions
which have received judicial recognition is merely by way
of limitation or qualification of the power. As a matter of
pure logic it might be argued that inclusion of the term "for
the public use" is also by way of limitation. In this connection, however, it should be pointed out that from the very
beginning of the exercise of the power the concept of the
"public use" has been so inextricably related to a proper
exercise of the power that such element must be considered as essential in any statement of its meaning. The
"public use" element is set forth in some definitions as the
"general welfare," the "welfare of the public," the "public
good," the "public benefit," or "public utility or necessity." 19
It appears quite clearly, from the historical works alluded to
above, and others, that the power to take private property for public use is most properly considered a power inherent in sovereignty
and unlimited, except, as every power in our system, to the achievement of a public purpose as broadly defined. And, as one work
puts it:
It does not require recognition by constitutional provision, but exists in absolute and unlimited form. Under this
doctrine, therefore, positive assertion of limitations upon
the power is required. This requirement is met by the provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to
the taking of property by eminent domain. Such constitutional provisions neither directly nor impliedly grant the
power of eminent domain, but are simply limitations upon
a power already
in existence which would otherwise be
20
unlimited.
2. The Nature of Limitations of the Power.-On Independence
Day very few of the original thirteen states had constitutional limitations upon the power of eminent domain, and very few adopted
limitations within the immediate years thereafter. North Carolina
has no constitutional limitation even today. Georgia had no limitation until 1865, and South Carolina until 1868.21
Madison, Hamilton and Jay felt it necessary to submit a Bill of
Rights to the states to help carry the ratification of the Constitution
of the United States..2 2 It is singular that although many of the
states had no constitutional limitations on this power of eminent
domain, the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights provided: That
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Today, all states except North Carolina have constitutional23
limitations upon the power of eminent domain. All such states
prohibit the taking of property except upon payment of "just," "reasonable," or "full" compensation, or the "equivalent in money. "24
19 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain 2-3 (3rd ed. 1950). As to whether the words "public use" constitute a limitation, see Lewis, Eminent Domain p. vi (3rd ed. 1909).
20 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain 14-16 (3rd ed. 1950). See also Lewis, Eminent Domain 21 (3rd ed.
1909).
21 For dates on which the various states adopted constitutional limitations, see 1 Nichols, Eminent
Domain 52-55 (3rd ed. 1950); Lewis, Eminent Domain 28-50 (3rd ed. 1909).
22 Swisher, American Constitutional Development 43-44 (1943).
23 New Hampshire, however, only requires that the taking be with the owner's consent or with
the consent of the "representative body of the people." Lewis, Eminent Domain 41 (3rd ed. 1909).
24 Lewis, op. cit. supra note 21, at 27-50.
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The limitation that just compensation must be paid for property taken for a public use, interpreted as indicated above, is the
usual one found in state constitutions. And, as we have seen above,
the term "public use" was construed by the courts to mean everything from actual use by the public to "public purpose" or "public
benefit."
The definition of the power of eminent domain in many states
permitted the taking of private property for "public use" in such
liberal terms that property could be taken for the "general welfare," the "public
good," the "public benefit," or the "public utility
2 5or necessity.
The earliest example of the taking of private property for a
"public use," which was not really for use by the public in the sense
that the public used the property, was the condemnation and overflowing of the property of others for the purpose of creating a mill
pond and a fall of water at a mill dam to turn the grinding mechanism of a flour mill. Such a taking was common in early New England. 26 Mills established as a result of the exercise of the power of
eminent domain were undoubtedly highly necessary and beneficial
to the whole public in early colonial days, but actual use was by the
mill owner.
Any doctrine, such as that accepted by some states to the effect
that a public use means any use which in any way contributes to
the public welfare, is likely to be pushed to the point of being difficult to defend. It was natural that persons having any desire at
all to invade the property rights of others would argue that the proposed use was beneficial to the public and that they should be permitted to condemn land of another for such things, for instance, as
logging roads, spur tracks from a saw mill to a railroad, for drainage of factory wastes, for recreation areas, or for a way of ingress
and egress to and from land not served by a road.
The early mill dam cases indicated that there was not only great
public benefit supplied by mills, but that no2 7miller could, morally
at least, refuse to grind the grain of another.
It was natural for the courts to extend the doctrine of the mill
dam cases to permit the taking of property for other purposes, because even though property for railroads, ferries, telephone companies and others was to be taken by private individuals or cor25 See note 17 supra.
26 For descriptive text and casessee Lewis, op. cit. supro note 21, at 544.
27 Lewis, op. cit. supra note 21, at 547.

Expert
Brief Printers

THE
AM

64277

(•/'J
THEen

• Commercial Printing
a Catalogues and Brochures
e Year Books-Magazines
Books - Book Binding
* House Organs

a

Delvr, Colorado

MAY-JUNE,

1962

DICTA

porations, and used for private profit, the public was to be permitted the use of the facilities.
More serious questions arose when the mill dam doctrine was
urged as precedent for permitting the taking of property for private
uses which indirectly and incidentally benefitted the public, but
which property the public had neither any right to use nor any interest in using. Certain ways of necessity, such as logging roads,
mining roads, cable trams for carrying ore from mine to mill, ditches and flumes to carry water from its source to a farmer's land, and
many others, were frequently sought to be condemned as taking
for public use.
Because the courts were finding difficulty in establishing the
boundary between takings of private property for public uses and
takings of private property for private uses, it was inevitable that
modifications in constitutions would be sought which would establish such a boundary.
3. Later ConstitutionalDevelopments.-In the latter part of the
nineteenth century another kind of limitation began to appear in
state constitutions. Before 1876 (the year in which the Colorado
Constitution was adopted) a number of states had adopted constitutional limitations seemingly calculated to restrict the scope given
to the prevailing constitutional limitations.
A really broad-sweeping, new kind of limitation was adopted
as a constitutional provision in Missouri in 1875, prohibiting the taking of private property "for private use . . . except for ways of ne-

cessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands of others
for agricultural and sanitary purposes ...

and whenever an attempt

is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the
question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a
judicial question, and as such judicially determined, without regard
to any legislative assertion that the use is public."
The Missouri limitation was adopted in virtually the same form
(but with sufficient difference in each case to indicate that careful
consideration was given to the suitability of the limitation to each
state) in the Colorado Constitution of 1876, the constitutiodns of Wyoming and Washington in 1889, and of Oklahoma in 1907. Illinois
in 1878, and New York in 1894 adopted or extended existing constitutional limitations along the same line. In 1889 Montana and
Idaho adopted constitutional provisions declaring private use of
ways to conduct water to reservoirs, and through ditches, flumes
and other ways to be public uses. 8
In passing, it should be noted that not all of the constitutional
developments indicated above were in the constitutions of new
states. Quite apparently there were problems in connection with
the taking of property for private uses that were recognized as in
need of correction in the states of Missouri, New York, Illinois and
Oklahoma. And just as apparently, the constitutional conventions
of new states coming into the Union recognized the necessity for
placing more specific limits on the power of eminent domain.
4. Comparative Interpretation of the New v. the Old Kind of
Constitutional Limitation.-Almost beyond question, the states
which revised their constitutions, and the new states coming into
"S For all the limitations indicated in the paragraph, see Lewis, op. cit. supra note 21, at 28-50.
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the Union, recognized that the doctrine allowing "for a public use"
to mean "for a public purpose" had been carried too far. The adoption of the new kind of limitation appearing in the Missouri Constitution of 1875 could mean nothing else.
It is interesting and instructive to sample a few opinions handed
down in the early period of the new limitation.
Illustrative, in the West, of contemporary judicial interpretation of the old, traditional prohibition that property shall not be
taken for a public use without compensation is the Nevada case of
Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell. 29 A mine operator
wanted a right of way over lands of others to take in timbers and
other supplies and to bring out ores. The court posed the principal
question for decision: "What is the meaning of the words 'public
use' as contained in the provision of our state constitution?"
Some indication of the reason for the new kind of limitation being adopted by both new and older states at that time may be ascertained from the language of the learned Nevada court:
No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon
which there is a greater variety and conflict of reasoning
and results than that presented as to the meaning of the
words "public use" as found in the different state constitutions regulating the right of eminent domain. The reasoning is in many of the cases as unsatisfactory as the results
have been uncertain. The beaten path of precedent to which
courts, when in doubt, seek refuge, here furnishes no safe
guide to lead us through the long lane of uncertainty to
the open highway of public justice and of right. The authorities are so diverse and conflicting, that no matter
which road the court may take it will be sustained, and
opposed, by about an equal number of the decided cases.
In this dilemma, the meaning must, in every case, be determined by the common sense of each individual judge
who has the power of deciding it. Upon examing the authorities, we find that private property has been taken
under a similar provision in the different state constitutions, for the purpose of making public highways, turnpike
roads, and canals; of building railroads; of constructing
wharves and basins; of establishing ferries; of draining
swamps and marshes; of bringing water into cities and
towns; of the establishment of water-power for manufacturing purposes; of laying out a public park; of constructing
sewers; of erecting levees, to prevent inundation; of building lateral railroads to coal mines; of laying pipe for the
transportation of oil from oil-wells to a railroad; of laying
gas-pipes; of disposing of stagnant and offensive water,
etc., etcY0
The Nevada court sustained the taking, on the authority of the
mill pond cases mentioned above, but not without some misgivings
as to the validity of the analogy. The way of precedent is hard; but
the way of independent thinking, by appellate courts, is harder still.
Better that the people would amend the constitution!
29 11 Nev. 394 (1876).
30 Id. at 400-401.
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Proceeding from the old to the new kind of constitutional
pro3
vision, we examine a case from the state of Washington. 1
The plaintiff, who had no way to get his saw logs to a mill,
sought a right of way across the land of another.
We will recall that Washington had, in 1889, adopted a constitution which provided that: Private property shall not be taken for
private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for drains,
31 Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pc. 681 (1903).
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flumes or ditches on or across the lands of another for agricultural,
domestic or sanitary purposes.
The plaintiff relied heavily on the doctrine of the mill dam cases
and urged the large element of public benefit to be created by his
logging operation as the element which would sustain his appropriation of defendant's property as a public use.
While conceding that there were many authorities following the
mill dam doctrine, the Washington court pointed out that those authorities were about equally balanced by decisions rejecting attempts to appropriate private property for private use on the theory
that the private use would produce public benefit.
Characterizing the mill dam doctrine as "dangerous," the Washington court said:
It seems scarcely necessary to particularize to show to
what extent this doctrine might practically be carried. Under such liberal construction, the brewer could successfully
demand condemnation of his neighbor's land for the purpose of the erection of a brewery, because, forsooth, many
citizens of the state are profitably engaged in the cultivation of hops. Condemnation would be in order for gristmills and for factories for manufacturing the cereals of the
state, because there is a large agricultural interest to be
sustained. Tanneries, woolen factories, oil refineries, distilleries, packing houses, and machine shops of almost every
conceivable kind would be entitled to some consideration
for the same reasons; thereby actually destroying any distinctions between public and private use, for the principle
in one instance is 2the same as in the other. The difference
is only in degree.
The Washington court rejected the mill dam doctrine, pointing
out that only Colorado and Missouri had constitutional provisions
regarding condemnation for a private use, and said:
That fact eliminates from the discussion in this case all that
line of cases which hold that the fact that the Legislature
has either pronounced a certain thing a public use, or has
so indicated by its enactment, by conferring the right of
eminent domain, ought to have great weight with the court
in construing the constitutionality of the act, because our
Constitution has expressly negatived any such idea; . . .3
Having thus expressed itself upon the question of the difference between the Washington eminent domain limitations and those
of most other states, the court held that the kind of way desired by
the plaintiff was not a "way of necessity" 34 and the contemplated
use did not qualify as one of the other private uses for which the
power of eminent domain was available under the Washington Constitution.
5. Development and Application of the Colorado Limitation.It is unfortunate that the Proceedings of the Colorado Constitutional Convention, held in 1875, do not contain any record of the
comments or debates on proposed provisions. However, it would be
32 Id. at 684.
33 Id. at 682.
34 Because at commn
law a way of necessity could be raised only out of land granted or
reserved by the grantor, and the defendant was a stranger to plaintiff's title.
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assuming too much to believe that the Committee on the Bill of
Rights, in proposing the new limitations on the power of eminent
domain, were not cognizant of the confusion that existed at that
time regarding the diversity in the cases which held that "for a
public use" meant everything from "use by the public" to "any use
by anybody that produces some public benefit." Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that there were large land holders in the convention desirous of insuring their ability to put water on their lands,
and that there were in the convention mining men intent on safeguarding their right to get men and materials to their mines and
their ores out. It is equally reasonable to assume that there were
land owners in the delegations who recognized the threat to their
holdings arising from miners, loggers and others who wanted constitutional sanction for private ways that would facilitate their
exploitation of natural resources.
It is not, therefore, to be supposed that the strangely new provision limiting the power of eminent domain written into the Colorado Constitution was a mere paraphrase or the result of a desire
to use refreshing new language to communicate old concepts. Lawyers just don't do things that way. They prefer to adhere to words
and phrases that have become technical in their meaning by virtue
of repeated use and judicial construction. Knowing the legal profession and its traditional way of operating, and knowing that constitutional conventions are the occasions most surely to invite presentation of all conflicting interests, we can be reasonably certain
that the language used in the Constitution of 1876 was meant to
change and make more specific the fundamental law as to what was
and what was not a permissible taking of private property in Colorado.
The Supreme Court of Colorado had occasion to apply the new
and different constitutional limitation in a decision only eleven
years after adoption of the constitution.35 The plaintiff sought to
condemn land for a private railroad over land of others, to take out
ore, claiming a right to do so under section 2407 of the General
Statutes of Colorado. The question of public benefit to be derived
from facilitating the mining industry, admittedly a matter of great
public benefit in those days, was not much labored in the case.
The court, with economy of words, held that "The right to condemn and appropriate private property, in the present case, being
for a private use, no argument is necessary to show that the taking of private property for the construction of a tramway does not
fall within the exceptions specified, to which the legislative power
is limited by the constitution."
It is somewhat singular that this case, although cited in the
petitioners' brief, was not mentioned by either the majority or minority opinions in Rabinoff.
II.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the Rabinoff case, urban renewal was sustained in Colorado.
The purported authority for urban, renewal, the Urban Renewal
Law enacted by the Colorado General Assembly, provides for the
creation of urban renewal authorities by cities. Clearly and un35 People

. District Court, 11 Colo. 147, 17 Pac. 298 (1887).
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equivocally, the intent of the legislature, manifest in the words of
the act, is to take possession and title of private property in areas
which are determined to be slums or blighted, to destroy the buildings and terminate the uses which are the source of slums and
blight, and to return the lands to other private owners for profitable exploitation.
In Rabinoff it was stipulated by both parties that the avowed
purpose of the undertaking by the authority is to acquire the properties by purchase or condemnation and as soon as possible thereafter sell a substantial portion of the properties to other persons
or corporations for redevelopment. In the process another objective
is to be achieved, namely, the elimination of slums and blight.
It was conceded by all that slum clearance is a proper objective
for exercise of police power. But the petitioners urged that the
avowed objective of taking their property for the purpose of reselling it to other private developers is prohibited by the Colorado Constitution which specifically prohibits taking private property for
private use except for certain kinds of uses.
The court rejected the contention, holding that the taking was
not for a private use, but for a public purpose, and for support for
its holding alluded to the fact that urban renewal had been sustained in nearly every state in which questioned, and by the Supreme Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. In
so holding, it is obvious that the bare majority of the Colorado court
completely disregarded the unequivocal language of the constitution. The court also overlooked the fact that Colorado and a few
other states have constitutional prohibitions much more restrictive
than the constitutions of most states and of the federal government
which only prohibit taking property for public use without just
compensation. It was inevitable that the majority of the state decisions, with which the majority of the court were so impressed,
would be different from decisions based upon the kind of limitation
found in the Colorado Constitution.
The extreme confusion in the various interpretations of the
eminent domain limitations usually found in state constitutions, at
the time of the Colorado constitutional convention, clearly suggests
that the convention wrote a new and different kind of limitation
into the Colorado Constitution deliberately and for the very purpose of preventing the kind of decision represented by Rabinoff.
The only objective that could possibly be served by the new
and different kind of prohibition was to make it clear that in Colorado private property was not to be taken for private use on the
theory that the new use served a public purpose and for that reason constituted a public use; and to make it crystal clear that private property cannot be taken and devoted to a private use as a
means of achieving some legitimate end.
The error in the Colorado decision lies in the failure by the
court to recognize that, in sustaining the public purpose to be
achieved by the Urban Renewal Law (slum and blight removal),
it approved the achievement of that quite legitimate end by a means
(taking private property for private use) specifically prohibited by
the constitution.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By

PAUL

F.

GOLDSMITH*

In reviewing the 1961 cases on the subject of contracts, some
cases have been here included that might also be included in a review of torts. These cases deal with fraud in the inducement of the
contract. They are included as bearing upon the measure of damages where the injured party has affirmed the contract and sued
for damages based on loss of bargain. The cases have been reviewed
under subject headings which, it is hoped, will prove useful as a
guide.
I.

CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

The case of Rupp v. Cool1 is particularly important to practicing lawyers. It is a reminder that while the attorney and prospective client may contract, without limit, with respect to the fees to
be paid to the attorney if such contract is entered into before the
attorney-client relationship exists, once the relationship does exist
the attorney must prove not only the contract, and its performance,
but also that the contract was fair and reasonable under all of the
circumstances and that the services to be rendered were reasonably
worth the amount charged. The court held it error for the trial
court to refuse the plaintiff attorney permission to amend his complaint to set up a separate claim based upon quantum meruit regarding services rendered. Apparently the case was reversed for
2
other reasons.

II.

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE: PARTIES To CONTRACT;
REFORMATION OF CONTRACT

Dismissal of an employment agency's complaint for recovery of
a fee for finding Perkins a job was affirmed in Wilson v. Perkins.3
Perkins had applied for a "sales" job and was placed by the agency.
After two weeks, the employer required that Perkins take one year
of paid training in the employer's shop to learn how to dismantle,
repair and assemble machinery and equipment sold by the employer. Perkins immediately notified the employer and the agency of
his resignation. There was no meeting of the minds between Perkins and the employer because Perkins thought he was to be a
salesman, and the employer was apparently seeking someone who
might be trained as a mechanic. Because the proposed offer of employment had been promptly rejected by Perkins upen learning of
the true nature of the job, the agency was not entitled to the em4
ployment fee.
The trial court's holding that an insured, who was an adjudicated mental incompetent, lacked the necessary capacity to change
*Member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Ass'ns, member of the Denver firm of Sears & Goldsmith and Instructor in Law, University of Denver College of Low.
1 362 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1961).
2 The client lost, in the original action for damages on an account stated, in a trial to the
county court. Upon an appeal to the district court the client requested the jury trial and the district
court refused to grant the same. This is apparently a case of first impression in Colorado and
construes Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-6-13 (1953) and Colo. R. Civ. P. 38, holding that either party on appeal
from the county court to the district court is entitled to a jury trial in the district court upon demand.
3 363 P.2d 492 (Colo. 1961).
4 The contract between Wilson and Perkins provided that Perkins would pay one-half of one
month's salary as an employment fee if Perkins accepted an offered job, and that he would either
promptly accept or reject any job offered.
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beneficiary under a benefit certificate was affirmed in Crain v.
Electrical Workers' Benefit Ass'n.5 Crain sought to collect under
the certificate by virtue of a change in beneficiary which was received and filed by the association three days after the insured had
been adjudicated a mental incompetent in Denver County Court
on a petition initiated by Crain.
The judgment in favor of an architect for a fee based upon ten
percent of the cost of construction was affirmed in Kovacheff v.
Langhart.6 Plaintiffs sought (1) to reverse this judgment on the
ground that they could not read the contract, (2) to recover an installment payment made to the architect, and (3) to rescind the
contract alleging the proposed structure was not to cost more than
$110,000 but that the estimated cost, based on bids on the drawings
and specifications was $150,000. The contract employing the architect was silent on the cost of the structure except to state that the
architect did not guarantee preliminary estimates of cost. The court
refused to relieve plaintiffs on their obligations under the contract
following the well settled rule that, in the absence of fraud, a party
cannot escape contractual obligations simply because the party cannot read the contract and does not know of its contents.
In an appropriate instance, the apparent party to a contract
may be disregarded where it appears that a person is acting in his
own behalf and not on the behalf of the apparent contracting party.
Such a case is Crowley v. Green.7 Plaintiff sued for the purchase
price of two hydraulic lifts which were sold by his assignor to a
corporation of which Green was a director, officer and stockholder.
At the time of the purported sale, the corporation was in dire financial difficulties, had no use for the lifts, and was not in the business
of selling such items. These facts were not disclosed to the vendor.
Green immediately appropriated the lifts to his own use, and shortly thereafter made a book entry upon the corporation's records applying the value of the lifts against the corporate debt due Green.
In reversing judgment for Green, the court approved the plaintiff's
contention that Green was acting in his own behalf in the purchase,
and that the corporation was only a conduit to pass the merchandise from the vendor to Green. A contrary holding would have preferred Green, the officer and director of the insolvent corporation,
and permitted a diversion of corporate assets to discharge a corporate obligation to an officer and director to the detriment of the
other creditors.
In Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins.
Co.," American Founders sought to recover judgment for monies
paid Colorado Management under a contract. The contract was
adopted by the directors of American Founders at a meeting attended by six of its eight directors. Three of those attending held offices
in both companies. Five were needed to form a quorum under the
by-laws. Plaintiff now contends the contracts were unauthorized
and voidable. Defendant contends that the contracts were later ratified at a meeting of the full board of directors. In general, judgment was affirmed for American Founders though modified in
5361
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8359
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amount. Thus, it was held that where two corporations have contracted with each other, the contract is 'Voidable if unfair to the corporation attempting to avoid the same, and if necessary to count the
directors common to both corporations in order to determine the
existence of a quorum of the directors of the objecting corporation.
It is the personal interest of the common directors that demands
this result. A later ratification of the minutes of the directors' meeting by the full board, and even by the stockholders of the corporations, was held to be equivalent to no more than an acknowledgment of the correctness of the secretary's report of the meeting and
did not constitute a ratification of the invalid contract.
In Sago v. Ashford,9 judgment against Sago for the balance due
on the purchase of goods was affirmed. Sago signed the order for
purchase with his own name but contends he was acting on behalf
of a corporation. The case holds that a person who signs a simple
contract without designating that he is acting as agent for another
is personally liable on the contract. However, in Quaker Hill, Inc.
v. Parr,0 the attempt to hold the promoter of a proposed corporation personally liable on a contract was defeated. Quaker Hill sold
goods to Denver Memorial Nursery, Inc., and a contract and promissory note were executed wherein Parr signed as the president of the
purchasing corporation. Plaintiff knew that the purchasing corporation had not been formed at the time of making the contract, but
urged the defendant to go ahead anyway. Plaintiff's position is that
defendant is personally liable as a promoter of the corporation. This
is the general rule. The court refused to apply the rule because the
plaintiff, being fully aware of the non-existence of the proposed
corporation, urged the entry into the contract in the name of the
corporation and thereby showed an intent to contract with the corporation, solely, and not with the promoter individually.
In Baumgartner v. Burt," Burt, as agent for various insurance
companies, sued Baumgartner for unpaid premiums of numerous
policies of insurance and recovered a judgment. The judgment was
reversed in favor of Baumgartner for the reason that the insurer is
the real party in interest, and as such, is the proper person to enforce the liability for unpaid premiums. The decision does state
9 358 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1961).
10 364 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
11 365 P.2d 681 (Colo. 1961).
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that an agent may sue in his own name when the insurer 1holds
him
2
liable for premiums, and he had paid the one in question.
Reformation of deeds was sought, but denied, in Segelke v. Kilmer.13 The holding reiterates the rule that the evidence necessary
to secure reformation must be clear, unequivocal and indubitable.
Reformation cannot be had "unless there is a preliminary or prior
agreement, either written or verbal between the parties, furnishing
the basis for rectification, or to which the instrument can be conformed."'1 4 Kilmer had leased her property to Ohio Oil Company
under an oil and gas lease reserving to herself the proceeds from
one-eighth of the oil and gas produced from the leased premises.
The lease contained the so-called "entirety clause."' 5 Thereafter,
Kilmer conveyed 160 acres of the leased land to her brother Cecil,
reserving one-half of the gas, oil and mineral rights. Cecil then
traded 120 of these acres to another defendant, excepting from the
conveyance the reservation by Kilmer, subject to the lease of Ohio.
Oil was discovered and produced for approximately five years, with
all royalty payments being made by the lessee to Kilmer until an
assignee of the lease discovered the entirety clause and withheld
further payment. Kilmer then sought to reform the deed claiming
that it was the intention of Cecil and his grantee that Kilmer should
have all royalty payments for oil produced on her retained property.
,The trial court's decree reforming the deeds was reversed because
the parties had never agreed upon the entirety clause of the lease.
There was no showing that the warranty deeds were intended to
be free from the operation of that clause.
III.

CONSIDERATION

In the following four cases, the direct issue was whether or not
there was adequate consideration to support a promise. In Burch v.
Burch,16 recitation of receipt of $10 and other good and valuable
consideration for a one-third interest in a described business, its assets and profits, in the absence of contrary evidence, was held to be
a sufficient consideration for the promise to transfer the one-third
interest. Accordingly, judgment for plaintiff for an accounting of
profits was affirmed.
In United W. Minerals Co. v. Hannsen,17 the lessee appealed
from an adverse judgment on the pleadings in favor of the lessor
for the second year's rental under certain mining leases of unpatented lode claims. Judgment for lessor was affirmed. The lessee
contended that the lessor had failed to make a discovery of minerals
on any of the leased mining claims, and therefore possessed no
property rights which could be made the subject matter of a lease,
and consequently asserted there was a failure of consideration for
the leases. The case states it is well recognized that location and
12 Since most agency agreements with insurance companies provide that the agent is personally
liable to the insurance company for the amount of the premium after the passage of a thirty, sixty
or ninety day period, it would appear that the agent is, under the above case, liable to the company on the one hand, and yet disabled from suing, without an assignment of the insurance company's interest, on the other hand.
13 360 P.2d 423 (Cola. 1961).
14 Id. at 426.
15 Id. at 425. "[AII rents and royalties accuring hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and
shall be divided among and paid to the separate owners in the proportions that the acreage owned
by each such owner bears to the entire leased acreage."
16358 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1961).
17 363 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1961).
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posting of the claim may precede the actual discovery of ore of
value. Prior to discovery, the prospector is protected, and has rights,
only against forcible and clandestine entries upon the situs of his
workings so long as he diligently prosecutes his work towards discovery. These protected rights were transferred, by the leases, to
United, and constituted the lessor's consideration for the leases.' 8
In Coughlin v. Truitt,19 it was held that a promissory note could
not be renounced or released by parol, therefore judgment for the
maker-defendant was reversed and the trial court was instructed to
enter judgment for the plaintiffs. The maker contended that the
20
payees of the note orally renounced the note. The Colorado statute
was construed as requiring that a renunciation of the rights in a
negotiable instrument be in writing, unless the instrument itself be
delivered to the person liable thereon. From this it follows that as
between the maker and the holder of a note the holder's written renunciation, even if not supported by consideration, could be set up,
successfully, as a defense on a promissory note.
Consideration for an oral promise to pay an increased price for
asphalt paving materials was found to be lacking in H. & W. Paving
Co. v. Asphalt Paving Co. 21 H. & W. contracted with Asphalt to
purchase its requirements of paving materials from Asphalt for
a period of five years at prices stated in the contract. Before February 1, of any year, Asphalt was entitled to advise H. & W. in
writing of increased costs in materials and labor requiring an increase in the original prices. In the absence of such notification, the
original price controlled. Asphalt sued to enforce a claimed oral
agreement increasing prices, but admitted not having complied with
the terms of the contract concerning price increase. Judgment for
Asphalt was reversed. The court held that even if there had been
a subsequent oral agreement for a price change, such agreement
was unsupported by any consideration. Where duties are imposed
by a written contract, in order that a subsequent parol agreement
may avoid such duties, the subsequent parol agreement must b Fup-ported by consideration moving to the party who is en-itled to
enforce the terms of the written agreement. 22 QUERY: Could the
parties to such a contract orally agree without consideration to
waive the conditions of notice and investigation since such conditions do not appear to be the agreed exchange of performances?
This proposition was not considered.
IV. CONDITIONS

In McKendrie v. Noel,23 plaintiff sold rug cleaning machines
to defendant who bought them relying on an advertisement that
the machines would be installed and operate satisfactorily. The
machines were not installed properly and did not operate satisfactorily. Such installation and operation were held to be conditions precedent to the purchaser's duty to pay the purchase price.
IS See Martz, Pick and Shovel Mining Low in an Atomic Age: A Case
L. Rev. 375, 380 (1955), cited, id. at 680.
19 367 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1961).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. 95-1-122 (1953).
21 364 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1961).
22 It would have been competent for the parties to hove entered into
the original contract and then to have entered into an oral agreement on
Schwortzreich v. Bauman-Bash, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921)
Colo. 456, 33 Pac. 165 (1893).
23 362 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1961).
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Judgment for the purchaser on his counterclaim to rescind the
purchase and recover the down payment anid out-of-pocket costs
of installation was affirmed.
The employer's defense, asserted in Empire Diesel, Inc. v.
Brown,24 to the employee's action for wages due and loans made

to the employer was an accord and satisfaction of the claims. Defendant delivered a check bearing a restrictive endorsement reading: "Endorsement constitutes payment in full for all . . . claims

against the company and the maker of this check. ' 25 Although
the employee retained the check he did not endorse or cash it.
Since the stated condition, i.e., "endorsement" did not occur, the
retention of it was not an acceptance of an offer to compromise the
disputed claim.
In Sanders v. Hart,26 a contract provided that the stock received
by defendant from plaintiff was to be paid for, at a stated price,
when sold. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed in a holding that
sale of the stock by defendant was a condition precedent to the
duty to pay for it, and that condition had not occurred.
In Scott v. Huntzinger,27 the broker sued for a commission
arising out of the sale of certain oil leases by the defendants to one
White. A written contract between the broker and defendants provided: "If the deal with White results in our sale of the property
as provided in the Agreement with him, then we will pay to you
as a commission .... -12 the amount sued for. Judgment had been
entered in favor of the broker for $5,000 and this was reversed.
Reversal was required inasmuch as White, who had taken only
an option to purchase the property, let the option lapse and thereafter a new and different deal for purchase was entered into and
consummated between defendants and White. There was no bad
faith on the part of defendants or White, nor any attempt to deprive
plaintiff of his commission. Plantiff's right to a commission was
contingent upon the condition of the original deal with White resulting in a sale. This condition
2 9 did not occur. The result of this
case seems to be well supported.
In Jefferson County Bank v. Armored Motors Serv.,30 the court
24 361 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1961).
25 Id. at 966.
26 365 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1961).
27 365 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1961).
28 Id. at 693.
29 See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 86 (1938) and Schonfeld v. Zinn, 192 lI.App. 456 (1915).
30366 P.2d 134 (Colo. 1961).
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held that the provision of a written contract between the defendant
and the bank, limiting the defendant's absolute maximum liability
to $30,000 and providing that any monies or property in excess of
that figure which the bank might entrust to the defendant should
be the complete responsibility of the bank, was reasonable and fair
and not contrary to public policy.
In Dawson v. Clark,3 1 the plaintiff-employee was held to have
violated an implied condition to his employment agreement by
competing with and injuring the business of the defendant-employers. Defendants purchased a sheet metal business from plaintiff.
As part of the purchase contract, defendants agreed to retain plaintiff in a supervisory capacity for one year. Within a six month
period plaintiff was discharged and brought this action for breach
of the contract. Defendants alleged that during his employment,
plaintiff carried on a similar business and at times even submitted
bids in competition with defendants. The lower court found this to
be the case and directed judgment for defendants on the grounds
that the dismissal was justified. Judgment was affirmed.
V.

INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT

A school teacher claimed his dismissal was a breach of contract
and sued for his salary for the balance of the year in School Dist.
38 v. Thomas.3 2 The contract with the defendant school district
provided that the teacher could not be dismissed "without good
cause shown, which includes a hearing." No charges were ever
tendered; no hearing was ever held; and no opportunity to be heard
was presented.
The dismissal was therefore in violation of contract
33
and statute.
In Froetschner v. Silkman,34 the supreme court approved the
orders in an action for a declaratory judgment. The court apportioned the soil bank payment which was received by the vendor
of land, during the year of sale, in accordance with the proportion
of time vendor and vendee, respectively, owned the property. The
court also approved an apportionment of the part of the first year's
delay rental on an oil and gas lease, executed by the vendor and
known to the vendee, on the same basis. The contract had been
silent as to these matters. The apportionment appears to have been
based on purely equitable considerations.
In Berry v. Asphalt Paving Co.,3 5 Berry and Keller entered
into a written agreement whereby Berry sold all of his interest
"whatever it may be" in the Paving Company to Keller for a fixed
sum. The parties also agreed that if a named accountant's financial
statement up to the date of the agreement showed an operating
profit, Keller should pay one-half of it to Berry. When this profit
was determined, Keller tendered the one-half profit to Berry who
refused to accept it claiming that it had been incorrectly determined.
The court found that plaintiff-Berry, and not the defendant, had
breached the agreement since the accountant's determination of
31 358 P.2d 591 (Colo. 1961).
32 363 P.2d 700 (Colo. 1961).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. 123-17-1 (1953) "No teacher shall Le dismissed without good cause .
Good cause requires "specific accusation, notice, evidence of the charge before the board in its
official capacity, and an opportunity to the teacher to be heard." School Dist. 2 v. Shuck, 49 Colo.
526, 531, 113 Pac. 511, 513 (1911).
34 362 P.2d 191 (Colo. 1961).
35 360 P.2d 980 (Colo. 1961).
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profit was not shovn to have been associated with fraud or bad
faith and was final, not subject to review, and binding upon both
parties. This view was supported by the contract language.
In Wilson v. Automobile Owners Ass'n Ins. Co.,36 an insurance
policy providing insurance for accidental bodily injury, sustained
while driving or riding within any automobile, "caused solely by
reason of an automobile, truck or bus accident" was construed to
cover the bodily injury of a passenger who was thrown to the floor
of a car which had to stop suddenly on rough road in order to avoid
hitting another car. The policy was not restricted to an accident to
the automobile; the language was construed to include an injury
occurring from an accident in the automobile. As has been frequently stated, insurance policies are construed most strongly
against those who write them, namely the insurance companies.
Accordingly, judgment was reversed in favor of the insured. The
policy did not define an automobile accident.
In Wise v. Nu-Tone Products Co.,37 Wise, who had been the

general partner in a limited partnership composed of himself and
his three sisters, contracted to sell "all of his right, title and interest" in the assets of the limited partnership to his three sisters for
a stipulated price. The sisters paid the price and formed the plaintiff corporation. After delivery of a bill of sale conveying the interest in the limited partnership, the sisters discovered that a policy
of life insurance had been taken out on the life of Wise, naming
Wise's previous general partner, and thereafter the limited partnership, as beneficiary. Plaintiff claimed as assignee of the sisters.
Summary judgment in favor of plaintiff for the cash :surrender
value of the policy, as of the date of the sale to the sisters, was
granted and affirmed. In so doing, the court held that where, as
here, a policy has been paid for by partnership funds, it is partnership property in the absence of a showing that the partners had
a contrary intention. Accordingly, the cash value of the policy was,
during the lifetime of the insured, partnership property.
The contractor in Granberry v. Perlmutter3s agreed to build
an addition to Granberry's home consisting of a double garage and
two bedrooms and a bath over the garage. The contractor filed suit
for the last payment and certain extras. The contract provided
(with reference to a bathroom): "Colorado Fixtures to consist of
one closet, one basin, one bath with shower over tub." Another
version of the contract, apparently introduced into evidence, provided "ceramic tile floor and walls four feet high and four feet over
tub." The trial court allowed payment to the contractor for the
inclusion of the ceramic tiling, as an extra, holding the same to be
a luxury. In view of the two versions of contract, the supreme
ccurt held that an ambiguity existed and that it was incumbent
upon the contractor to have resolved the ambiguity. Further the
cost of inclusion of ceramic tile in a new addition, especially since
wall and floor coverings in the bath are different from the wall and
floor coverings elsewhere, should be pre-determined by the contractor. Therefore the allowance of the cost of such covering as an
extra was unwarranted.
36366 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1961).
37367 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1961).
38364 P.2d 211 (Colo. 1961).
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In Burt v. Craig,39 the declaratory judgment entered by the

trial court was affirmed. Craig was the purchaser, under a written
contract, of the Burt Insurance Agency. The contract provided
that in the event of a default by Craig in payment of certain monthly amounts due on account of the purchase price, Burts had the
right to terminate the contract, retaining all previous payments as
liquidated damages. They had the further right to reassume the
agency and its equipment with the appreciation or depreciation of
the agency being figured by a formula consisting of the average
annual net commissions times 13/4, plus furniture, fixtures and
equipment. Burts attempted to show by parol evidence that certain
commissions on so-called "target or public" insurance business were
to be excluded from the average commissions. This evidence was
rejected. The court approved the holding that had it been intended
such commissions be excluded, a provision to that effect should
have been inserted in the agreement.
The broker in Miller v. L. C. Fulenwider, Inc.,41 recovered a
judgment in trial to the court for $75,000 on an oral listing by
defendant Miller to sell certain stock in Miller's Supermarkets, Inc.
The broker negotiated the sale and the seller circumvented the
broker, claiming the listing had expired, and dealt directly with
the purchaser. The trial court's finding that the sale was caused
to be made through plaintiff's efforts and its judgment for plaintiff
were affirmed. Miller contended that evidence of an oral listing
was inadmissible and pointed to two exhibits, in writing, which
he contended limited the listing to a certain time and could not be
explained or varied by parol evidence. In rejecting this contention,
it was held that the written agreements were ambiguous and an
inaccurate expression of the listing between the parties. Under
this state of facts, issues were presented as to whether the parties
had made a contract and if so whether the writings expressed that
or
contract. Accordingly, evidence which would tend to explain
4
clarify the intent and hopes of the parties was admissible. '
VI.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

The case of Cold Spring Tungsten, Inc. v. American Steel &
Iron Works, Inc 4 illustrates the discharge of a disputed claim by
39 360 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1961).
40362 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1961).
41 See 3 Corbin, Contracts § 573 01960).
42 361 P.2d 773 (Colo. 1961).
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accord and satisfaction. American contracted to perform certain
work for Tungsten. When a dispute arose concerning two aspects
of the project American made repairs demanded by Tungsten in
accordance with an agreement evidenced by a letter from Tungsten
to American. Tungsten later refused payment. American secured
judgment and an order directing foreclosure of its material and
labor lien. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that
the parties had settled a disputed claim by the plaintiff's correction
and the defendant's acceptance of the corrections. The defendant
was estopped from urging a matter which may have constituted a
counterclaim existing at the time of making the compromise.
43
In Aronoff v. Carraher,
certain additional questions, not resolved in the previous Aronoff case, 44 were raised and answered.
The court held, in regard to accord and satisfaction, that the receipt
and retention by the receiver of the insurance company of a check
marked "full payment" does not relieve the policy holder from
paying any remaining balance if the assessment as originally computed by the receiver was in an erroneous amount. The receiver,
being an officer of the court, has a duty to assess and collect in
accordance with a court order.
The court refused to find an accord and satisfaction of plaintiff's
claim for unpaid commissions in Pospicil v. Hammers.45 Plaintiffsalesman sued to recover commissions due and owing to him on
automobile sales made over a period of years while in the employment of one defendant as a proprietor, three other defendants as
partners in an automobile sales agency, and a corporation as the
last employer. Judgment against the individuals and the corporation was rendered in favor of the plaintiff by the trial court. It was
admitted that if any debt was owing, it was owing by the corporation. Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish when the debt for
commissions arose, judgment against the individual defendants
was reversed. In affirming the judgment against the corporate
defendant, the court found that checks which had been tendered
to the plaintiff, from time to time, and accepted by him had not
been tendered nor accepted as a full and final settlement of all
claims up to that date. Plaintiff testified that he had always pressed
for settlement on his commissions and had been led to believe that
settlement would be forthcoming though it was never made. The
court quoted Pitts v. National Independent Fisheries Co.46 as
follows:
In order to constitute an accord and satisfaction, it is
necessary that the money should be offered in full satisfaction of the demand, and be accompanied by such acts and
declarations as amount to a condition that the money, if
accepted, is accepted in satisfaction; and it must be such
that the party to whom it is offered is bound to understand
therefrom 47that, if he takes it, he takes it subject to such
conditions.

43
44
45
46
47

361 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1961).
Aronoff v. Pioneer Mut. Compensation Co., 134 Colo. 395, 304 P.2d 1083 (1956).
365 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1961).
71 Colo. 316, 206 Pac. 571 (1922).
Id. at 318, 206 Pac. at 571.
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See Empire Diesel, Inc. v. Brown,48 supra, which could have
been included in this section of the review.
VII.

ADVANCED

COMMISSIONS
49

In Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare the employer, Argonaut,
sued Dare for claimed loans. Dare answered that the monies sued
for had been advanced to him as anticipated commissions without
agreement to repay. The trial court's dismissal was reversed and
a new trial ordered. This case is something of a landmark in that
it distinguishes Dare's position, described as an independent contractor, from the position of employees in two previous Colorado
cases. 50 Where an employee has received advances in regular
amounts in lieu of salary or wages, a presumption arises that these
advances are recoverable only from commissions and thus an excess
debit balance in the employee's account cannot be collected by the
employer. In Dare's case, he was credited with 60% of the profit,
when collected, on any building or remodeling job; charged with
advances as they were made; and, also charged with losses on the
basis of 60% of the loss on the applicable job. Regular statements
of account were rendered to him. Being in the nature of an independent contractor, Dare became a bona fide debtor, unless, on a
new trial, he would be able to show that he was an employee and
should be treated as the employees were in the two distinguished
cases. 51
VIII.

FRAUD,

ETC.

The following cases in which fraud or undue influence became
an issue at one point or another have been divided so as to emphasize the effect of the fraud (a) upon an attempted rescission, (b) as
a defense to an action upon the contract, or (c) as a ground for
damages where a material fact had been concealed. The cases deal
with the measure of damages for fraud and deceit and have been
included for reasons stated in the introductory note to this review.
A. Rescission of Contract or Deed for Fraudor Undue Influence
In Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 52 Dr. Hinshaw, being then eighty years
of age, married one of the defendants. Shortly thereafter, he made
and executed deeds conveying a house and a ranch to his new wife.
The wife then conveyed the house to her sister, a co-defendant. The
doctor brought action to cancel the deeds alleging fraud and undue
influence but died before trial. His executor was substituted. At
the trial, sufficient evidence was introduced to show that the new
wife had a plan or scheme to get rid of opposition and any impediments even prior to her marriage to the doctor. The trial court
granted a motion to dismiss after the defendants rested their case
without presenting any evidence. By reason of the age of Dr. Hinshaw at the time of execution of the deeds and other evidence, the
supreme court, in reversing, found that plaintiff had sustained the
burden of proving the existence of undue influence in securing the
48 361 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1961).
49 359 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1961).
50 Gross Bergman Mfg. Co. v. Fell, 80 Colo. 239, 250 Pac. 387 (1926),
Ins. Co. v. Atschel, 97 Colo. 377, 49 P.2d 385 (1935).
51 Ibid.
52 365 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1961).
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deeds, making it incumbent upon defendants to present evidence
to rebut the presumption and inference of undue influence, the same
being presumed from the relationship, circumstances, and conditions of the contracting parties. Since the defendants rested without presenting any evidence, at which time their motion to, dismiss
was granted, and since they then had the burden of proving the lack
of such influence or fraud but did not do so, they are not entitled
to a new trial. Accordingly, judgment for defendants was reversed
and ordered entered in favor of plaintiff.
To set aside a deed the evidence of fraud must be clear and convincing. Such evidence was found to be lacking in Schwindt v.
Schwindt, 53 and the deed complained of was not set aside.
In General Credit Corp. v. Bill Olsen's Motor, Inc.,5 4 rescission

was denied. Motor, Inc., sold an automobile to a corporation and
delivered the automobile together with the certificate of origin to
A, the vice-president and general-manager of the corporation, and
received what purported to be the corporation's check on its Texas
bank account. A then took the automobile to Nebraska, presented
the certificate of origin to General Credit and applied for a $2500
loan against the automobile. General Credit verified A's authority
to act on behalf of the corporation and granted the loan, applying
$500 of it to A's old account with the lender giving the balance to
A in cash. The purchase-money check bounced, and Motor, Inc.,
then caused the automobile to be picked up and returned. In the
meantime, General Credit secured a valid mortgage on the automobile and brought a separate action for recovery of the auto. In reversing judgment in favor of Motor, Inc., the supreme court held
that General Credit was a bona fide purchaser for value. 55 This result is in accordance with the Uniform Sales Act. 56 Judgment was
accordingly awarded against Motor, Inc., for the amount of the loan
less the $500 which had been credited by General Credit, on its
books, to the previous account of A.
53 363 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1961).
54 363 P.2d 489 (Colo. 1961).
55 General Credit's inquiry of A's authority to act for the corporation which purchased the car
was an inquiry dealing only with A's authority and not an inquiry as to the validity of the sufficiency of the corporation's title to the automobile.
56 Colo. Rev. Stat. 121-1-24 (1953). The Act provides "Where the seller of goods has a voidable
title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good
title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the
seller's defect in title." In this instance, General Credit is the buyer and the corporation is the
seller with the defective title. The buyer had no notice of the seller's defective title.
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Benson, the insured, sued to recover the cost of an operation
which would have been included under the terms of a health or
medical payment insurance policy issued by Bankers, in Benson v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. 57 The trial court dismissed his complaint
after finding that Benson had made material misrepresentation of
his past medical history and that the seller's agent had falsely told
Benson that Bankers was not interested in any portion of his medical history except that which related to the five years prior to the
application for the policy. The application contained the language
that Bankers "is not bound by any knowledge of, or statements
made by, or to any agent, unless set forth herein." 58 The court applied an applicable statute-"9 stating in part that "no statement or
declaration made to or by an agent, examiner or other person, not
contained in the application shall be taken or considered as having
been made to or brought to the notice or knowledge of the company,
or as charging it with any liability by reason thereof." Accordingly,
the agent's statement that the company was not interested in Benson's medical history except during the five years prior to the application could not relieve Benson of the duty to answer truthfully
concerning questions directed to that prior medical history. QUERY:
Could not Benson, if he acted in good faith, bring an action in tort
against the agent?
In Woodhams v. Amy,60 action was brought to recover the balance of a savings account. The monies used to open the account had
originally been in a joint account in the name of the decedent and
a trustee under a written trust instrument. The trustee later placed
the funds in her own name. In holding that the action by the executor to recover the funds was well founded, the court stated that
it was an established principle "that the fiduciary could not take
advantage of her trust position to obtain the proceeds of a trust account unless she maintained the burden placed upon her to show
that the transaction giving her the benefit as survivor was fair, just
and reasonable." 61
B. Fraudas a Defense to an Action on Contract
In Stoner v. Marshal,6 2 the payee of a promissory note, given as
part of the purchase price of a business, sued the maker of the note
and won, notwithstanding the maker's contention that the note was
induced by the payee's fraudulent representation concerning immediate past profits of the business. The purchaser, perhaps unfortunately, stipulated to dismiss her counterclaim for damages
based upon the alleged fraud. Thereafter the purchaser's attempt
to defend the suit on the note by an allegation of fraudulent inducement was rejected on the authority of Handy v. Rogers.63 It is
unfortunate that the court chose to support its opinion by quoting

language of Tisdel v. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co.,64 for the

quoted language from Tisdel is at best unwisely worded, and as to
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

362 P.2d 1039 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 1040.
Colo. Rev. Stat. 72-1-25 (1953).
365 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 697.
358 P.2d 1021 (Colo. 1961).
143 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 819 (1960), citing with approval Restatement, Contracts § 480 (1932).
90 Colo. 114, 6 P.2d 912 (1931).
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principal features,6 5the only similarity is that both actions were upon
promissory notes.

66
Phillips, as assignee of a note
In Bell Press, Inc. v. Phillips,
given by Bell and the corporate defendant to Golden Press, Inc.,
brought action upon the note. After allowing certain reductions,
judgment was awarded to Phillips. Defendants sought reversal
claiming that part of the consideration for the note had been the
transfer of the accounts receivable which plaintiffs' assignor had,
by its general manager, represented to be "collectible" at the time
of the transaction. In discussing this phase of the case, the supreme
court pointed out that since there was no warrant of collectibility,
the person making the statement that these accounts receivable
were "collectible" did no more than state his opinion. Such a statement was not a statement of present fact nor a false representation
of a material fact which either existed at the time of the statement
or had existed in the past. At best, it meant that, in the speaker's
opinion, the claim was legally demandable and the debtor was of
competent ability to pay it, but it did not mean that the debtor
would pay the debt. The contract did not contain any provision for
deduction of amounts due on the assigned accounts which might
later prove to be uncollectible.
C. Concealed Defect as Ground for Damages in Fraud and Deceit
The defendant company won a reversal of an adverse judgment
in Denver Business Sales Co. v. Lewis."7 Plaintiffs had purchased
a home which had been constructed by one of the defendants and
sold through another. The home had been built on soil which was
rendered unstable by reason of certain qualities of the soil which
permitted it to expand and contract in such a manner as to damage
the foundations and walls of the home. An instruction was given
to the jury that plaintiffs might recover on the theory of a concealed defect if the defendants knew "or by the exercise of ordinary
65 In Stoner v. Marshal the court quotes Tisdel, id. at 917, "If one elects to affirm the agreement, after full knowledge of the truth respecting the false and fraudulent representations, and
thereafter continues to carry it out and receive its benefits, he may not thereafter maintain an action
in damages for deceit, because this would constitute a ratification of the agreement and a condona.
tion of the fraud; otherwise one might, with knowledge of fraud, speculate upon the advantages
or disadvantages of an agreement, receive its benefits, and thereafter repudiate all its obligations."
(Emphasis added.) In Tisdel the continuation and the benefits consisted of the defendants giving
not only a first note in satisfaction of prior obligations, which note they claimed was induced by
fraudulent representations, but, with knowledge of the claimed fraud, giving also a second note
in satisfaction of the first and a third note in satisfaction of the second, all the while having secured
benefits of a forbearance of the plaintiff to sue on an original guaranty. In Stoner v. Marshal,
Stoner simply remained in possession of the donut shop and made five payments on her purchasemoney note. The second and third notes in Tisdel were truly evidence of ratification of the original
note and evidence that there was no fraud in the inducement of that note. This element is lacking
in Stoner v. Marshal. This ratification, in Tiscel, would be an estoppel to an action for damages
for deceit. The pronoun "this" in the citation quoted from Tisdel, is completely baffling if intended
to refer to maintenance of an action in damages for deceit as being a condonation of the fraud.
The only sense in which such an action for damages is a ratification is that by bringing an action
for damages the injured party waives the right or power to avoid the contract for the fraud. In
same instances, foregoing an action for rescission, will permit alternative actions: (a) an action in
deceit for damages based on the tort or, (b) an action in contract as for breach of warranty. The
measure of damages in each instance will be the difference between the contract price and what the
value would be if the subject matter were as represented ("loss-of-bargain rule"). In the action
for fraud, exemplary damages and body judgment may both be recoverable. In the action for
breach of warranty, neither of these elements is recoverable. In the action for rescission, based
on fraud, the parties would be restored to status quo and a body judgment could issue. Compare
Aoberg v. Harman, 144 Colo. 579, 358 P.2d 601 (1960). This reviewer is unable to see any possi.
bility of condonation of the fraud where the "defrauded" purchaser simply remains in possession
and continues to make payment without entering into a substituted contract as was done in Tisdel.
The remainder of the quoted portion of the Tisdel case deals only with the waiver of the right or
power to rescind by-failure to act promptly. Such waiver prevents the defrauded party from saying
on the one hand there is a contract and on the other there is not a contract.
66 364 P.2d 398 (Colo. 1961).
67 365 P.2d 895 (Colo. 1961).
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prudence should have known ....

the nature of the soil and failed

to disclose it to the buyers." This instruction was apparently based
upon dicta in a previous case. 6 The supreme court made it clear
that its previous holdings were not intended to establish a precedent
that liability for fraud founded upon a non-disclosure would exist
without proof of actual knowledge of the fact which was allegedly
concealed. Accordingly, judgment was reversed with instructions
to grant a new trial.
D. Measure of Damages for Fraudand Deceit
In Corder v. Laws,6 9 the vendor of real property, in order to
produce the appearance of value which would support the asking
price of the property, submitted, through his agent, to the vendees
a written five year lease between the vendor and a fraternal organization at $200 per month covering the second floor of the premises.
At the time of this submission, the vendor knew that the fraternal
organization had already determined that it would move out of the
premises, but he had prevailed upon the organization not to move.
Relying upon the representation of an existing lease, the plaintiffs
purchased the property. Three months later the fraternal organization moved without ever having paid any rent. The vendees affirmed the transaction and brought an action in tort for fraud and
deceit. The trial court directed the verdict for plaintiffs on the issue of liability and submitted the question of damages to the jury
instructing them that the measure of damages is the difference between the actual value of the property and what its value would
have been had the vendor's representations been true. In affirming
a $5,200 verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the supreme court approved
the direction of the entry of a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on
the question of liability since the evidence was such that reasonable
men could reach but one conclusion, namely, that the vendor had
been guilty of fraud, and further affirmed the election by Colorado
to follow the loss-of-bargain rule instead of the out-of-pocket rule
in arriving at damages in cases of fraud.
An excellent discussion of loss-of-bargain damages is given in
the case of Shirley v. Merritt.70 Plaintiff sought to secure a new
68 See Cohen v. Vivian, 141 Colo. 443, 349 P.2d 366 (1960),
Ga.App. 654, 179 S.E. 213 (1935).
69 366 P.2d 369 (Colo. 1961).
70 364 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1961).
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trial on the question of damages alone after a jury verdict in her
favor based on fraud and deceit. Plaintiff was the purchaser of a
laundromat. The selling agent, through one of its partners, Mr. Corbin, had represented the gross business during a three to four month
period prior to sale as $1,200 to $1,400 per month. Plaintiff proved
that gross sales during her operation of approximately seven months
averaged $650 per month. Plaintiff thereupon sold the business for
$7,800 in an effort to mitigate her loss, and brought this action for
actual and exemplary damages. The jury found that fraud had been
committed and the only issue was the question of the adequacy of
damages. The court instructed that the measure of damages was
loss-of-bargain. 71 The supreme court held that by reason of the
great gap between the damages awarded and the damages evidenced the jury had abused their discretion in fixing the amount of
damages, and a72new trial was ordered limited to actual and exemplary damages.
IX.

BROKER'S SUITS FOR COMMISSIONS

In the cases reviewed, oral listings fared better than written
listings. However, this was only because the brokers produced buyers under oral listings but did not produce buyers in the cases involving written listings.
The broker in Minissale v. Goldman,73 was denied recovery on
his suit for commission on well recognized principles, the trial court
having found that the broker failed to establish that he was the efficient agent or procuring cause of the sale.
Brewer, the owner-seller in Brewer v. Williams,74 presents an
example "of an owner circumventing his broker by appropriating
his client and seeking to escape his commission by slight changes
in the terms of the [sale]."75 The employment of the broker in the
instant case was by an oral contract. Following this oral contract
the broker's saleswomen made continuous efforts with the knowledge and encouragement of Brewer to sell her tavern and real property. Upon being advised that Brewer would sell the tavern and
lease the property, one of the saleswomen produced an interested
buyer. Thereafter Brewer terminated all contact with the broker
and its saleswomen and within a few days concluded a sale of the
property on terms essentially like those which she had indicated a
willingness to accept. Having produced the purchaser, ready, willing and able to purchase on the terms and conditions prescribed by
71 The instruction as to damages submitted by the court, told the jury that compensatory damages
"are measured by the difference between the actual value at the time of purchase and what the value
might have been if the representations had been true." Id. at 196.
72 Had the damages been liquidated and undisputed, the supreme court would have exercised
its authority to increase the judgment to correspond with the liquidated amount. Plaintiff's evidence
of value at the time of sale was based upon an expert's testimony that since the water consumption
at the laundromat, prior to sale, was essentially the some as that after sale, the income being proportional to the water consumption, the income before must have been the same, essentially, as
after sale and that based upon the after sale income the value would be $7,800 to $8,000. The
jury having awarded $1,850 actual damages and $450 exemplary damages, it appeared to the
supreme court that the jury concluded the market value of the subject business at the time of
purchase was approximately $15,500. There was no evidence to estab ish this value, whereas
plaintiff's uncontradicted evidence as to value at the time of purchase was stated by the supreme
court to have been legally sufficient to the extent that the jury was not justified in disregarding
plaintiff's evidence of value. Upon retrial, it was ordered that instructions regarding the definition
of market value and an instruction concerning the expert's testimony should be given even though
the parties may not have asked for same.
73363 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1961).
74 362 P.2d 1033 (Colo. 1961).
75 Id. at 1036, citing Houston v. H. G. Wolff & Son Inv. Co., 94 Colo. 73, 77, 28 P.2d 255, 256
(1933).
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the owner, the court held the broker may have the commission, notwithstanding the change of terms which result from further negotiations of the owner and purchaser.
In Miller v. L. C. Fulenwider, Inc., 6 the so-called written listing contracts were ambiguous. The actual listing which the court
enforced was essentially an oral agreement established by parol evidence. The case is discussed above under Interpretation of Contract.
X.

QUASI CONTRACT

In Wistrand v. Leach Realty Co.,77 plaintiff (Leach) acted as
agent for Evans in sale of a home to Wistrand. Plaintiff drew up a
settlement sheet and payments were made accordingly. Later, plaintiff discovered that certain items properly chargeable to Wistrand
had not been placed on the sheet. This action was brought to recover the loss on theory of unjust enrichment. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed.
In quasi contract neither privity nor promise is necessary. The
action was for the purpose of putting the parties in proper position
so neither suffered loss nor made gain.
XI.

MISCELLANEOUS

CASES

Three joint venturers brought separate complaints against a
fourth venturer for an accounting. All complaints were consolidated
for trial in Griffith v. Cooper.7 8 The evidence showed the defendant
to have suffered a loss in excess of $17,000. Defendant appealed from
dismissal of the complaints alleging that the court was under duty
to enter judgment for defendant, even though he did not affirmatively move for judgment in the pleadings. The action was reversed
and remanded with directions to enter judgment against the plaintiffs for their respective shares of the proven loss of the joint
venture. The case contains a warning that a suit for an accounting
includes an offer by the plaintiffs to pay any balance that may be
found against them.
Two cases involved matters relating to third party beneficiary
contracts. The right of an adoptive child, as a third party donee
beneficiary to a decretal contract between the adoptive child's
father and the court decreeing the adoption, was upheld in Pool v.
76 362 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1961).
77 364 P.2c 396 (Colo. 1961).
78 359 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1961).
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Harold.7 9 The adoption decree recited an agreement of the adopting
father with the court not to disinherit the adopted child. The father
then bequeathed only $10 of his $9,800 estate to the adopted child,
and the rest to strangers. The adoptive parent was held to be bound
by his agreement which deprived him of the power to dispose of
his property in a manner contrary to the third party donee contract. Notwithstanding a basic dislike to such forced inheritance,
the court held it was bound to follow Dillingham v. Schmidt,80
and it distinguished the present case from Quintrall v. Goldsmith.s1
In the present case and in the Dillingham case, the plaintiff was
the adoptive child of the adopting parent to the date of that adopting parent's death. In the Quintrall case the plaintiff did not bear
the relationship of an adopted child to the adopting parent as of
the date of the adopting parent's death, there having been a subsequent adoption of the child during the lifetime of the first adopting parents. In Field Family Constr. Co. v. Ryan, 2 a judgment
creditor or Florado Construction Company garnisheed Field Family
Construction Company which had assumed the debts of Florado to
third parties. The assumption of debts was held to be a chose in
action owned by the judgment debtor which the garnishee was
bound to report in its answer to the garnishee summons.
In Wilder v. Barker,83 a mother borrowed money on her property for the accommodation of, and loaned the money to, her
daughter and son-in-law upon their promise to repay it. When the
mother sued the son-in-law, he raised two defenses: (1) Plaintiff
had orally released the daughter. (2) The debt was discharged in
bankruptcy. The supreme court affirmed the holdings that an oral
release, unsupported by consideration, is not binding and that the
defendant's failure to schedule the debt, plus his failure to notify
plaintiff of the bankruptcy resulted in the debt not being discharged
in bankruptcy.
A summary judgment in favor of defendant was affirmed in
Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc. 4 Plaintiff sued for commissions
alleged to have accrued in 1952. The complaint was filed in 1959.
Affidavits filed under Colo. R. Civ. P. 56 established that the defendant, continuously from 1937, had maintained a salesman in
Colorado who solicited orders, occasionally delivered skis, made
collections and credit investigations and arranged for *exchange of
defendant's products. Under these facts, the court held that the
corporation was at all time present in the State of Colorado for
purposes of service even though no consent to be sued or authorization had been given to the agent (salesman) to accept .service of
process. The statute of limitations was not tolled as plaintiff
claimed.8 5
In Polichio v. Oliver Well Works, Inc.,8 6 the elements of an
79 367 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1961).
80 85 Colo. 28, 273 Pac. 21 (1928).
81 134 Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (1956).
82360 P.2d 110 (Colo. 1961).
83 362 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1961).
84 364 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
85 The court cited C. E. Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. District Court, 188 Colo. 270, 332 P.2d
208 (1958).
86 362 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
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account stated were again reviewed.87 The trial court had erroneously instructed that the reception of statements of account coupled
with retention of them and a failure to object within a reasonable
time constituted an assent to the correctness of the account. Consequently the action was remanded for a new trial. The court approved
the proposition that an account stated which related only to a numerical computation is prima facie evidence of the amount due, whereas
such an account stated may be binding if it represents an agreement of compromise or settlement of an unliquidated claim.8 8
Two cases dealt primarily with elements of contract damages.

9
In Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co.,
plaintiffs claimed to hold seven options for the purchase of 234,000
shares, aggregate, in defendant, the option price being $2.00 per
share. On June 3, 1958, plaintiffs attempted to exercise the option.
Defendant refused to honor the same. The market price on the
stock, according to plaintiff's own evidence, varied from 85c to
$1.15 per share between June 1 and July 15, 1958. The court applied,
correctly, the Uniform Sales Act as the measure of plaintiffs' damage, viz: the difference between the contract price and "the market
or current price of the goods at the time or times when the option
had been delivered or if no time was fixed, then at the time of
the refusal to deliver." 90 On this basis, dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint was warranted inasmuch as the option price was in excess
of the then current market price. Plaintiffs contended that special
circumstances existed which would permit the award of additional
damages and pointed to the fact that they paid $149,177.50 for the
options. However, the cost of the options is not a proximate damage
arising out of the refusal to issue the stock.
The court held in Hunter v. Wilson 9l that the statute 92 allowing
recovery of interest as damages in a contract action must be strictly
93
construed. Under this cited statute and a previously decided case
interest cannot be granted in an action for the fair and reasonable
value of work and services performed. Such an action is one for
quantum mer ; and as such is for an unliquidated demand. Unliquidated de ands are not included in the strict construction of
the statute.
In Addressograph-MultigraphCorp. v. Kelley, 94 the trial court's
refusal to grant a temporary injunction under Colo. R. Civ. P. III
(a) (3) was reversed with instructions to grant the injunction.
Kelley and his partner had individually contracted with Addressograph not to compete with Addressograph for a period of one year
after termination of their respective contracts and within one hundred miles of the office in which they might be employed at the
date of such termination. Immediately upon termination of their
employment Kelley and his co-defendant formed a partnership
87 The elements are: 1. an account which must have been examined and accepted by the parties;
2. an agreement that the balance and all items of account representing the previous monetary transactions of the parties are correct; 3. an admission of liability by the apparent debtor for the amount
of the balance against him; and 4. the assent of both parties and a meeting of the minds.
88 See 6 Corbin, Contracts 5 1308 (1962).
89 359 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1961).
90 Colo. Rev. Stat. 121.1-67 (1953).
91 362 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1961).
92 Colo. Rev. Stat. 73-1-2 (1953).
93 County Comm'r v. Flanagan, 21 Colo. App. 467, 122 Pac. 801 (1912).
94 362 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1961).
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dealing in identical equipment to that handled by Addressograph
and contacted persons whom they had previously contacted while
employees of Addressograph. The supreme court specifically found
that the restriction on competition, stated in full in the report, was
reasonable. The reader will remember that such restrictions are
generally enforceable only if justified by the circumstances surrounding the particular contract and that reasonable limitations as
to both time and space should be stated to limit the scope of the
restrictive covenant. 95
In Seale v. Bates, the plaintiffs had entered into various contracts with a corporate dance studio for several hundred hours of
dance instruction. The contracting studio assigned the contracts,
after full payment for the same had been made, and after partial
performance by the studio, to another corporate entity. The assignee
assumed the obligation to teach plaintiffs. Plaintiffs on being informed of the assignment did not object to the same and proceeded
to take some lessons, two plaintiffs taking thirty one-half hour lessons and the other plaintiff taking twelve or thirteen hours of lessons. Plaintiffs then asserted a right to rescind and recover the very
substantial sums they had paid for the contracts because the assignee's ballroom was too small and overcrowded, and the instruction was not always given by one of the opposite sex. The original
contracts were silent as to these matters. Another ground for rescission was that the contract was a personal service contract and therefore not assignable without the consent of the students. The trial
court's finding that the students had consented to the assignment
plaintiffs
was upheld. If this consent had not been present, the
would have succeeded in their action for rescission.9 6 The other
matters objected to by plaintiffs were not made conditions of the
such
assigned contracts and the court correctly refused to include
conditions as being implied in the nature of the contract. 9T The case
of Contracts.9
cites, with approval, two sections of the Restatement
99
In Lembke Plumbing & Heating v. Hayutin, Hayutin sued
Lembke for damages in tort, arising out of the negligent failure of
Lembke to properly install certain plumbing apparatus whereby
water escaped causing severe damage to Hayutin's home. A judgment of $26,000 was obtained. Mr. Justice Frantz wrote the decision
making it clear that the action was based not upon contract but
upon tort, stating that even though the contract did not provide
for such damage, there is a common law obligation to exercise due
care, caution and skill resting on all persons and in all undertakings
when the rights of others are involved. Although this duty may not
be contractual, the law allows no vacuum; it imposes duty.)')
95 359 P.2d 356 (Colo. 1961).
96 See Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379 (1888). Also see Restatement, Contracts § 160(4) (1932).
97 This case does present helpful guideposts in advising a student concerning his rights against a
"school" should the school mistreat the student or otherwise materially fail to perform.
98 Restatement, Contracts § 160(4) supro note 96, and § 348 dealing with restitution.
99 366 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1961).
100 In arriving at this conclusion. Mr. Justice Frantz cited 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 20: "Accom.
panying every contract is a common low dut) to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and
faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these conditions
is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract. In such a case, the contract is mere inducement creating the state of things which furnishes the occasion of the tort. In other words, the contract creates
the relation out of which grows the duty to use care." There may even be some indication through
the dicta in the citation to Hunter v. Quality Homes, 45 Del. 100, 68 A.2d 620 (1949), that this duty
to do the work with reasonable care and diligence, for the breach of which the law imposes a liability, runs not only to the contracting parties but also to a third person.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By

ROBERT

B.

YEGGE*

The Law must be stable, but it
must not stand still.
Roscoe Pound, Introduction to
the Philosophy of Law (1922)
To satisfy the curious statisticians, there were thirty-three cases
in the tort field decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1961.
And if one is really interested in statistical meaninglessness, twentytwo of the trial court decisions were affirmed, ten were reversed, and
one case was returned to the trial court for a determination of the
issue of damages alone. Of the twenty-two cases affirmed, fifteen
were judgments for the plaintiff. Of the ten cases reversed, seven
of the lower court judgments were rendered in favor of the defendant. The case remanded on the issue of damages alone was, obviously, a verdict for the plaintiff.
I. CLEAR PRINCIPLES REAFFIRMED
The bar was heartened by the fundamental reassertion of the
purpose of the law of torts in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Horn Tower Constr. Co.' The telephone company brought an action
against a subcontractor to recover on the theory of trespass for severance of an underground conduit. The jury rendered a verdict for
defendant, and plaintiff sued out writ of error, urging that absolute
liability for damage as a result of trespass to the personal property
of plaintiff was involved and that the issue of absolute liability
should have been submitted to the jury, not merely the issue of
negligence. The court defined trespass to chattels as "the intentional
interference with the possession or physical condition of a chattel
in possession of another without justification." Thereafter, the court
re-established sound but fundamental tort law in two respects:
(1) The court, through Mr. Justice Doyle, discarded plaintiff's
argument that: It is not necessary that the defendant shall have
acted maliciously toward the plaintiff's property; it is sufficient if
defendant intentionally did the act which resulted in the damage.
Instead, the court stated: "The alleged wrongdoer must have intended the result, or must have acted wantonly or at least negligently. Unintentional non-negligent interferences with chattels is
not actionable." 2 The court exemplified by saying: "The driving of
an automobile in heavy traffic will not subject the driver to a claim
in trespass by one whose car is struck. In this' latter case liability
would have to depend on proof of negligence.

3

(2) "The doctrine of this case has been universally accepted
and applied and has been the basis for the fundamental principle
of the law of negligence and its corollary, the law of wantonness,
that fault of the action is an essential ingredient of liability."'
*Partner in the Denver firm of Yegge,
Denver Law Center.
1 363 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1961).
2 Id. at 178.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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Additional sound law in bailments was announced in Bankers
Warehouse Co. v. Bennett.5 Defendant was bailee of certain nut
meats. There was evidence that the nut meats were received by the
defendant in good marketable condition. When the nuts were withdrawn from the warehouse by the plaintiff, they were contaminated
and unusable for the purpose intended-the nuts being impregnated
with the odor of moth balls. The plaintiff offered no testimony of
specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant bailee. The
court stated: "Under the law applicable to such a situation, a presumption of negligence on the part of the bailee at once arises, and
the burden of going forward with evidence to overcome this presumption rests on the defendant.. .. Here it was incumbent upon
the defendant to show that the nut meats were not contaminated
by reason of its negligence. This it failed to do."6 Judgment for the
plaintiff in the trial court was affirmed. It is good to see that the
law remains stable.
II.

THE PRICE OF MENTAL ANGUISH

Some established principles of law were constantly reaffirmed
by the court in 1961. Denial of recovery for mental anguish unaccompanied by physical injury was not an exception to this desirable consistency.
In Valley Development Co. v. Weeks,7 plaintiff sought damages,
and other relief, as owner of a water and ditch right which supplied
her lands with irrigation water, resulting from defendant's relocation of the ditch. The court held that plaintiff had a vested right in
the ditch which was protected from defendant's interference, and
that an action in tort would lie for any such interference. However,
the supreme court reversed that part of the judgment entered in
compensation for mental anguish suffered in connection with the
interference. The court said:
Without detailing at length various opinions in the above
citations, suffice it to say that under ordinary circumstances
there can be no recovery in tort for mental anguish suffered by a plaintiff in connection with an injury to his
property, either real or personal. Where, however, the act
occasioning the damage to property was inspired by fraud,
malice, or other such motives, mental suffering is often held
to be a proper element of damage."
The supreme court refers to the fact that the trial court found no
willful and wanton conduct on the .part of defendant. On the basis
of this finding, the supreme court found error in the trial court's
award of damages, in any amount, for mental pain and suffering.
In Grant v. Gwyn,9 defendant in the lower court inserted a
counterclaim asking damage to her person and business reputation
and for having suffered shock and mental distress as a result of
alleged disturbances and annoyances occasioned by the plaintiff.
The trial court dismissed the claim and the supreme court rightfully affirmed the dismissal saying:
5 365 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1961).
6 Id. at 891.
7 364 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1961).
8 Id. at 733.
9 365 P.2d 256 (Colo. 1961).
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In essence, it is a claim for damages arising from alleged
emotional disturbance resulting from alleged threats and
"annoying" conduct attributed to Gwyn which caused
"mental distress" in the mind of Grant, over a period of
time (not specified), prior to the incident of March 21, 1956,
which forms the basis of Gwyn's complaint. Counsel for
Grant has cited no case which holds that damages for such
an emotional disturbance can be adjudicated. 10
III. ANIMALS AND ORDINANCES
Animals were considered with some frequency this year. In
Swerdfeger v. Krueger," an eleven year old boy entered the defendant's unfenced yard where the defendant's Malemute Husky
was securely chained to a dog house. Before entering the yard, the
boy's companions warned him that the dog had vicious propensities.
Nevertheless, the boy entered the yard and, as expected, was bitten.
Suit was instituted by the mother for injury to the minor. It was
urged that according to established Colorado authority absolute
liability is imposed on an owner of a dog known to be vicious. 2
The court dismissed this contention as not supported in Colorado
law. Further the court found, as dictum, that contributory negligence could form the basis of defense in a case of this nature. In
reversing a judgment for the minor and dismissing the case, the
supreme court states that the minor "deliberately put himself in
harm's way with full knowledge and understanding of what his
companions had told him about the dog."' 13 According to the Restatement of the Law of Torts, such circumstances absolve a dog owner
of liability to a trespassing child. Two dissents raise the question of
contributory negligence of an eleven year old, and the soundness
of the Restatement principle with respect to technical trespasses by
children and the variable standard between children and between
children and adults. It appears that children must still be taught
that vicious dogs bite.
An early 1961 case announced some sound law with respect to
statutory construction and provided some subtle humor. In Moore
v. Fletcher,14 we find two disgruntled (for whatever reason) hunters suing a fellow hunter for injuries sustained from the muzzle of
a .22 rifle. The plaintiffs arrived at defendant's land in the darkness
of early morning. There, without permission of the defendant, they
dug their goose pit. Little known to them, the defendant was in a
similar blind nearby. As dawn broke, the defendant noticed plaintiff's decoys and shot into them. One shot hit one plaintiff. A second
shot hit another plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiffs were
trespassers and that defendant did not know of the plaintiffs' presence until after the shots were fired. The trial court entered judgment of dismissal on these facts. Our supreme court affirmed the
judgment asserting that defendant, a lessee in possession, breached
no duty to plaintiffs in that he owed only the duty to have his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to give warning of latent or
concealed defects. No additional duty was owed since defendant was
10 Id. at 259.
11 358 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1961).
12 Yegge, Dog's Bill of Rights, 34 DICTA 178 (1957).
13 Swerdfeger v. Krueger, supro note I1, at 482.
14 363 'P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
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not aware of the presence of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs urged that violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. 62-12-3 (1953), regarding use of a rifle or
pistol to hunt, kill, or scare migratory waterfowl, was negligence
per se. Mr. Justice McWilliams pointed out that the statute was
enacted to protect waterfowl, not poachers. The statute could not
establish negligence per se when it was not enacted to protect the
interests of the class of which the plaintiffs were members. The
law does not protect migratory goose hunters without "licenses."
The court twice again considered the effect of violation of a
statute or ordinance as establishing negligence, absent proof. Colorado, in 1961, did not look with favor upon the attempted establishment of fault without proof of negligence. In Piper v. Mayer,15 the
trial court instructed the jury as to numerous statutory provisions,
pertaining to parking and required lights on the highway, in a case
wherein the plaintiff's vehicle struck a parked and disabled vehicle
on an icy highway. The trial court instructed the jury that if it
found that any of the provisions of the statutes had been violated
and the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, said violation constituted negligence per se. The court, in evaluating the evidence, pointed to facts showing independent cause of the accident
and concluded: "In the light of these factors, it is impossible, in
the present state of the record, to find evidence suggesting that
statutory violations by the defendants constituted the proximate
cause of the collision."' 6
In a distinctly worded opinion by Mr. Justice Moore, a 1961
case 17 established that violation of a city ordinance, which violation
was not proximately connected with the damage, could not in itself
form the basis for plaintiff's recovery. The plaintiff argued, as the
sole ground for charging the defendant with responsibility for the
accident, that the defendant's violation of an ordinance disallowing
persons from leaving running motor vehicles unattended, was negligence per se. Plaintiff contended that this violation was the proximate cause of the accident involving a vehicle owned by defendant
and operated by a thief. The court stated that violation of an ordinance adopted for the safety of the public may be negligence per se,
but it is nevertheless essential to recovery of damages based upon
such violations to establish that it was the proximate cause of the
15 360 P.2d 433 (Colo. 1961).
16 Id. at 437.
1- Lambotte v. Payton, 363 P.2d 167 (Colo. 1961).
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injury complained of. "The violation of a statute or ordinance enacted for the protection of persons or property does not ipso facto
import liability unless the violation be shown by proper proof to
be the proximate cause of the injury.""8
Animals and statutes found their common ground in State v.
Morison.19 Plaintiffs, upon legislation allowing suit against the
agents of the sovereign, sought to recover for loss of their herd of
cattle after the herd had been infected with paratuberculosis.
Plaintiffs alleged that a neighbor's herd of cattle showed symptoms
of paratuberculosis and that such was called to the attention of the
state veterinarian who refused to act to prevent the spread of the
contagious and infectious disease. To assist in establishing negligence on the state veterinarian's part, the plaintiff contended that
the state veterinarian breached certain duties thrust upon him by
statute and that the violation of these statutory duties constituted
negligence. The statute imposes a duty on the State Agricultural
Commission to take steps that will prevent the spread of disease
within the state. Mr. Justice McWilliams, in a well reasoned opinion,
found that the statute in question was designed to protect not only
the general public, but also a class of persons of which the plaintiffs
were members. Accordingly, the plaintiffs could properly rely on
the statute to show defendant's negligence.
IV. FRAUD: TRADITIONAL AND AGGRAVATED
Fraud with respect to real property thrice faced the Colorado
Supreme Court in 1961. Fraud cases covered cheating the aged,
over-puffing the property intended for sale, and inflating the income potential of rental property.
20
Poor old Dr. Hinshaw met his match in Cora Marie Hook.
The well-to-do eighty year old man married the younger woman,
after which time she would not live with him until he conveyed
two valuable pieces of real estate to her for only nominal consideration. The executor of Dr. Hinshaw's estate brought suit against
Cora Marie to cancel the two deeds. The trial court dismissed the
suit on the ground that no fraud was established. The supreme court
stated: "It is true, as the defendants urge, that the burden of proof
to establish fraud and undue influence is upon him who asserts it,
and that it must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.
However, we have held that fraud in some situations may be presumed from the relationship, or from the circumstances and conditions of the contracting parties."' The court reversed the judgment
of dismissal, finding that the record disclosed a substantial inequality between the parties and thus, the burden shifted to the former
wife to prove that the transactions were in fact fair, just and reasonable and not fraudulent. Often, the law does not look out for
those who look out for themselves.
Corder v. Laws 22 affirmed a judgment in favor of a vendee
against a vendor. The vendor represented to the vendee that the
second floor of the premises, which were later purchased, were being rented for $200 a month on a five year lease. Leases substantiat18 Id. at 168.

19 365 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1961).
20 Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 365 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1961)
21 Id. at 817.
22 366 P.2d 369 (Colo. 1961).
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ing such representation were shown to vendee. However, the vendor
failed to reveal that he had a private understanding with the tenant
that the tenant need not pay rent for the first six months of the
tenancy, and the vendor did not reveal that the tenant did not
intend to live up to the terms of the lease. As a result of the failure
to reveal the true relationship between the vendor and the tenant,
the court affirmed a judgment for damages against vendor based
upon fraud.
23
Lastly, Denver Business Sales Co. v. Lewis

considered the

representation of a seller of real property that "the house was built
and constructed of the very finest material and workmanship; that
it was constructed in such manner that it was and would be trouble
free, and was ready for the plaintiff to occupy over a long period
of time. '24 In fact, there were some geological problems with the
soil on which the house was built, which it was alleged were not
properly provided for in the construction period. Objection was
taken to the instruction given on fraud which included that "the
sellers failed to disclose a matter which in the exercise of reasonable
care they should have known." The court stated: "The inclusion
of this language in the instruction was error. In an action based on
fraud, which generally involves a corrupt motive, one cannot be
held liable for concealing a condition concerning which he had no
knowledge. 2-5 The court pointed out that the applicability of exercise of reasonable prudence with respect to acts in negligence cases
has no application to cases based on fraud and deceit. Hear no evil,
speak no evil, see no evil.
V.

WHEN NEGLIGENT CONDUCT

Is

NOT NEGLIGENCE

The question of health as it affects the capacity to commit a
negligent act was twice discussed by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Renell v. Argonaut Liquor Co. 20 concerned a rear-end accident.

The attack by the plaintiff was twofold: negligence of the employee
in operation of a motor vehicle, and negligence of the employer
who knew or reasonably should have known that the defendant was
too drowsy, overworked and fatigued to drive an automobile on the
public highway. The jury returned a verdict for defendants, driver
and employer. First, the court established that if in fact the defendant "blacked out" or "fainted" under circumstances not foreseen
by him, he would not be answerable as negligent for events which
occurred while he was blacked out or in a faint. Second, the jury's
findings with regard to the fainting and with regard to the employer's alleged neglect would not be disturbed under the circumstances of the record.
Johnson v. Lambotte27 considered the question of whether a
person who is mentally incompetent can be held liable for tortious
conduct. Affirming a judgment against a defendant who was under
treatment for chronic schizophrenia, but had not been adjudicated
mentally incompetent, the court cited with approval Corpus Juris
Secundum, Insane Persons, section 122, which concludes that an
insane person may be liable for his tort, the same as a sane person.
23 365 P.2d 895 (Colo. 1961).
24 Id. at 896.
25 Id. at 898.
26365 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1961).
27 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961).
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except perhaps those in which malice and intention are a necessary
ingredient.
VI. WHEN No CONDUCT Is NEGLIGENCE
Another insight into the law regarding imputation of negligence
28
Neglifrom driver to passenger was gained in Lasnetske v. Parres.
gence was imputed from the driver to the passenger inasmuch as
both driver and passenger contributed their respective earnings to
the maintenance of the household; the automobile was jointly
owned by them; and the accident occurred as the two were driving
home from work. An additional fact was present, however: The
passenger did not have a driver's license and did not know how to
operate an automobile. The Colorado court affirmed its prior holding that joint ownership, occupancy, possession and use in a joint
mission presumes an agency. 29 In addition, it rejected the significance of the inability of the passenger to drive, authority of other
jurisdictions to the contrary notwithstanding. It is hard to say
whether the law remains stable.
VII. UNDAMAGED:

RES

IPSA LOQUITUR

Res ipsa loquitur again found its way to the Colorado Supreme
Court for interpretation in 1961. The court treated the fiction wi'h
care by strictly applying its tenets in conjunction with other well
established and reaffirmed torts principles.
In McGee v. Heim,3 0 plaintiffs, owners of real property, sued
their tenant for damage occasioned by fire which took place in the
rented premises. Plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court reaffirmed the principle that, under usual circumstances, the mere happening of a fire, or the happening of an accident, under mysterious circumstances, cannot alone call the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur into play. In holding that the doctrine did not
apply in the present case, the court stated: "When it can, with equal
reasonableness, as here, be inferred that the accident in question
was due to a cause other than the alleged negligence of the defendant, res
ipsa loquitur may not be invoked against such a defend31
ant.

The plaintiff in Flader v. Simonsen3 2 attempted, for the first
time in the supreme court, to argue that injury sustained by a pas:S 365 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1961).
29 Moore v. Skiles, 13)

Colo. 191, 274 P.2d 311 (1954).

20 362 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1961).
31 Id. at 196.
32 3 6 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1961).
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senger in a private aircraft invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The court rejected the argument as too late, as not urged in the
trial court and as inconsistent with proof of negligence offered in
the trial court. However, the court affirmed the trial court in finding that the facts were such as not to warrant invoking the doctrine.
Worthy of speculation is the disposition of the seven justices
when the doctrine is timely urged in an accident of this kind. With
the increased use of aircraft for everyday transportation, the issue
will doubtless be resolved soon. Does the law remain stable, or do
the artifacts of modern technology demand different rules?
VIII. RISKS AND GUESTS: CONTRIBUTORY AND ASSUMPTIVE
The year 1961 saw an interesting admixture of contributory

negligence compounded with assumption of risk to which was added
a dash of the guest statute.

33
With respect to contributory negligence, Stevens v. Strauss

reaffirms a well known principle saying: "No obligation rests upon
a plaintiff to negative contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is not presumed. While the proof offered by the plaintiff may
establish contributory negligence, unless it so appears, such negligence is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving it rests
upon the defendant. '34 Such statement was made in rejecting the
defendant's assignment of error that the plaintiff failed to plead
and prove freedom from contributory negligence.
In Farmer v. McColm, 35 plaintiff was riding a motor scooter

on a street which was snow-packed and icy, cut off his throttle and
tipped over, after which he was struck by an oncoming motor vehicle. It was resolved in the trial court by a directed verdict for the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law. The supreme court, in reversing the directed
verdict, stated that the evidence was sufficient to make the issue of
contributory negligence a disputed one of fact properly to be resolved by the jury, and under the circumstances should not have
been resolved by the trial court as a matter of law. "Intelligent jurors might well differ in their opinion as to whether under all the
circumstances plaintiff was negligent in the manner in which he
attempted to stop his motor scooter '36
when confronted with what he
deemed was an emergency situation.
Radetsky v. Leonard37 established: "It is not necessarily negligence for a pedestrian to be a short distance outside of a crosswalk
if such does not lead to resulting injury. ' 38 This determination was
made by the supreme court in reversing a judgment for the defend-

ant in a case .wherein the defendant made a left turn and hit the
pedestrian outside of the crosswalk. The supreme court stated that
there was error in submitting the question of contributory negligence to the jury. The trial court should have directed a verdict for
the plaintiff, where the sole defense appeared to be that the plaintiff was outside the crosswalk.
33
34
35
36
37
38

364 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 384.
364 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 1061.
358 P.2d 1014 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 1016.
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Assumption of risk, somewhat confused with contributory. negligence, seemed to mix well with beer in 1961. In Appelhans v. Kirkwood,3 9 a fourteen year old plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle
driven by defendant which collided with a post on the Valley Highway. Both plaintiff and minor defendant had been drinking beer
prior to the accident. After entry of judgment for the plaintiff,
defendant sought reversal on the ground that as a matter of law the
plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury. In denying the defendant's
contention, the court said: "Plaintiff's age and mental immaturity
were matters to be considered by the jury in measuring the extent
of the plaintiff's knowlege of automobiles and alcohol, and were for
the jury to weigh and consider in determining whether there was
a voluntary 4assumption
of risk with full knowledge of the hazards
0
threatened.
In Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim,41 a passenger sued the driver
of an automobile for injuries when the automobile skidded over and
down the bank of a mountain highway. The defendant driver had
been drinking beer and his driving ability was impaired. Again it
was urged, after entry of judgment for the plaintiff, that a verdict
should have been directed for the defendant upon the evidence of
drinking by the defendant driver which would establish assumption
of risk as a matter of law. The court did not agree. The trial court
properly submitted the case to the jury, leaving to the jury the
factual issue of proximate cause of the accident. It seems that the
amount of beer consumed was a disputed issue of fact. Whether
fact or law, the court considered that the extent to which the consumption of beer affected the driver's operation of the vehicle was
a question for the jury.
Both the Appelhans and Pletchas cases considered the applicability of the guest statute, at least indirectly. Appelhans states that
the cause was submitted to the jury, pursuant to the guest statute,
when apparently no question of the guest statute was raised. Pletchas affirmed the trial court's holding that the guest statute was
inapplicable to the case, inasmuch as custom among professional
wrestlers (both plaintiff and defendant being professional wrestlers) was for a passenger (plaintiff) to pay the driver (defendant)
on a mileage basis at the end of the trip. Hence, the defendant was
a carrier for hire; the guest statute did not apply by its own terms.
IX. Is AN ACCIDENT EVER UNAVOIDABLE?
As one might expect, the apparent mythological legal principle
of "Unavoidable Accident" was raised in Piper v. Mayer.42 There, in
a case for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident,
the defendants' vehicle spun out of control on an icy highway and
hit the rear of the plaintiff's stalled and parked car. The trial court
submitted to the jury the question of unavoidable accident, and the
jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The supreme court reversed, stating that the unavoidable accident instruction was error;
observing that there was evidence the defendants were driving at
an unreasonable rate of speed in view of the road conditions; and
39 365 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1961).
40 Id. at 237.
41 365 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1961).
42360 P.2d 433 (Colo. 1961).
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holding "the jury should have been permitted to resolve this conflict free of the confusion resulting from submission of a theory of
law leading to the conclusion that plaintiffs might not be permitted
to recover irrespective
of the negligence or non-negligence of the
43
defendants."

Is there such a thing as a doctrine of "Unavoidable

Query:
Accident"?
X.

THE VARIOUS DUTIES TO PROTECT INVITEES

The duty owed business invitees was four times considered. The
matter of proof of negligence was considered in Remley v. Newton.4" A child guest at a resort was found lying unconscious on the
ground near a tether ball pole which was not anchored to the
ground, but merely held upright by an iron wheel. The court affirmed the principle that proof of the happening of an accident or
occurrence of injury alone raises no inference of negligence. The
court went on to say that negligence may be established by facts
and circumstances surrounding the accident. Toward that end the
claimant had offered the testimony of an employee of the school
district whose job it was to install and maintain playground equipment, including tether ball equipment. The testimony was proffered
to the issue that there was a safe way to install such equipment so
that a child would not get hurt and so that there would be no danger of the pole toppling. It is inferred from the opinion that the
proffered testimony would establish that the equipment was not
properly installed by the defendant. The trial court had excluded
such evidence. In reversing this order, the supreme court cited Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 343, and concluded: "If, as
contended by counsel for plaintiff, there is a safe and proper way
to install tether ball equipment which is uniformly maintained on
children's playgrounds, we see no reason why testimony establishing that fact should be excluded. '45 The court rejected the argument
that there is a distinction between a playground at a school and a
playground at a vacation resort in allowing the "expert" testimony
of a man familiar with school equipment, and not familiar with
resort equipment.
46
In a somewhat different conclusion, Blackburn v. Tombling
considered the propriety of a judgment against a hotel operator for
injuries sustained by a plaintiff who fell on the hotel steps. When
cne of the outer doors of the hotel was opened it extended about 20
inches beyond the outer side of a step down to the sidewalk level.
The plaintiff suffered the injury while leaving the hotel through
this door. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to call a so-called
expert witness to testify that defendant's doorway constituted a
dangerous condition. The expert was an architect who had long
practiced in the community of the hotel, and had constructed many
hotels. The witness testified, as an expert, that it was his opinion
that the doorway condition was dangerous. In this case the court
held that the expert's testimony was not admissible. The court
reaffirms the age old principle: "There is no need for expert opinion
43
44
45
46

Id. at 436.
3,4 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 583.
365 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1961).
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with reference to facts involving commonplace occurences." Soundly, the court also found error in admission of evidence that other
persons had fallen or stumbled over the doorway in question prior
to the time of the plaintiff's accident, saying: "Plaintiff made no
attempt to establish any similarity of the circumstances of the isolated events and the accident in question. There was no showing
whether such prior incidents occurred while persons were entering
or leaving the hotel; whether they occurred in the daytime or at
night, or whether they were in any way similar to the accident in
question. '47 There is no mention of the duty of care imposed on a
hotel operator in the opinion.
For children and tether balls, experts on proper construction
are competent to testify; for adult hotel guests, experts on proper
construction are not competent.
Nettrour v. J. C. Penney Co. 48 at last establishes a duty owed

to an invitee by the owner of property. In this case, a five year old
boy was injured while riding an escalator in defendant's department store. Upon the following evidence, the trial court granted a
directed verdict to the defendant: The escalator started and stopped
in a jerking sort of way, the child's mother's attention was misdirected, and soon she heard her child calling, after which she saw
that the child had fallen and his right index finger was engaged
between the moving step and the side wall of the escalator. The
mother vainly attempted to have the escalator stopped and finally
47 Id. at 245.
48 360 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1961).
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she disengaged the child's finger. Evidence disclosed that the emergency stop button on the escalator was located at such a place that
there was no warning or directional sign near it. The court impliedly rejected the argument that the defendant was functioning
as a common carrier and cited Corpus Juris Secundum for the general rule that the owner of property owes to an invitee or business
visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for safety
commensurate with the particular circumstances involved. Nevertheless, on the particular facts, the supreme court reversed the directed verdict for defendant, holding that the case should have been
submitted to the jury, there being present issues upon which reasonable minds might differ. Apparently, although it is not clear,
the difference would be on the interpretation of an ordinance requiring emergency stop buttons.
Another case involving the liability of hotel owners was Sniezek
v. Cimino,4 9 setting forth a test for duty of care owed an invitee.
A neon sign repairman, in repairing the hotel owner's neon sign,
was electrocuted as a result of a stray wire in the area of repairs.
The trial court directed a verdict for the hotel owner, to which the
claimant took exception. First, the supreme court held that the
repairman, who was an employee of the neon sign company, was
an invitee, as to the hotel owner. Second, in affirming the directed
verdict, the court set forth the duty of the hotel owner as applied
to the facts of the case, saying: "Such owner can only be held responsible for those hazards about which he knows or should have,
as a prudent man, discovered. In the case at bar, had the roof been
accessible to the Blairs [owners] and had they made an investigation, it would not have altered the situation since their knowledge
is not shown to have been sufficient to detect the danger or warn
the decedent or his employer of the hazard."5 0
Regularly used escalators and five year olds are certain circumstances which raise factual issues of safety; uninvestigated, undetected dangers and adult repairmen are certain circumstances which
do not raise factual issues of safety. Department stores and hotel
owners are prudent men who should detect knowledgeable dangers.
XI.

MALPRACTICE OF TRADESMEN

Surprise! There were no medical malpractice cases in 1961 before the Colorado Supreme Court. However, the malpractice of occupations less traditionally known as professional did concern the
Colorado court.
Plumbers' malpractice was twice the subject of litigation reaching the Supreme Court of Colorado in 1961. Lembke Plumbing and
Heating was sued by a homeowner as a result of damage for failure
to protect a pipe in a concrete wall and for damage occasioned by
a broken tube while the plumbing firm's employee was performing
repair work at a later date.51 In defense, Lembke urged contributory
negligence because the plaintiff failed to have soil tests made which,
the defendants urged, would have shown water in such amount as
to expand the clay, such expansion causing the damage. The court
49 360 P.2d 813 (Colo. 1961).
50 Id. at 815.
51 Lenbke Plumbing & Heating v. Hayutin, 366 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1961).
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found that the evidence did not show an abnormal water content in
the soil, and further stated: "Hayutins [plaintiffs] were not bound
at the time of construction or prior thereto to anticipate defective
plumbing and leakage and to make provision therefor. ''52 Defendant
further urged that a printed form contract signed by the plaintiff
precluded recovery by the recital that the contract "lawfully expires
one year from date." The court held that the contract does not provide a substitute statute of limitations for acts of negligence in the
absence of an express provision therefor and again reaffirmed the
principle that contracts limiting liability are strictly construed.
Upon review it was found that the finding of negligence in the lower court was justified and the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
In Larrick v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.,53 the automobile dealer had

engaged Larrick to build an addition to. its body shop. Larrick employed a plumber to relocate steam pipes connected with the heating
plant. The plumber, acting under instructions from the general contractor, shut off the gas boiler, drained the same, relocated the pipe,
filled the boiler again with water and then undertook to light the
gas burner. It was found that the boiler was dry and extensive
damage was suffered as a result of dry-firing. In the suit, the plumber cross-claimed against the general contractor for indemnity. In
affirming a judgment against the plumber and the general contrac52 Id. at 677.
53 362 P.2d 1030 (Colo. 1961).
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tor, the court observed that the plumber was wholly unqualified
to do the job he undertook and it was due to his lack of qualifications, ineptitude and negligence that caused the boiler to be dryfired and damaged. Furthermore, it was found that the general contractor and plumber were joint tort feasors and, therefore, there
was no right of indemnity.
XII. A MISCELLANY ON PROOF
Contaminated food was the subject of litigation in Gonzales v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. 5 4 Plaintiff, in preparing dinner, opened a can

of peas, poured them into a clean saucepan, warmed them and
served them to her husband and herself. While eating the peas,
the plaintiffs, husband and wife, discovered a bug in the peas. Alleged injury followed. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. In the supreme court the case was reversed. The
court reaffirmed the implied warranty of fitness in food and rejected the trial court's resolution of "a case of equal probability."
The trial court apparently took the view that through inadvertence
the bug got into the food while being prepared in the plaintiffs'
kitchen. The supreme court stated that where evidence concerning
material facts is such that reasonable minds could differ, a case
should be submitted to the jury and the court's refusal to do so was
error.
An interesting review of acts of a private airplane pilot which
do not constitute negligence with respect to a non-paying passenger
in such aircraft are discussed in Flader v. Simonsen.55 In the case,
judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the trial court for negligence, allegedly in the defendant's failing to use due care with
respect to operation of the airplane. In a lengthy discussion of the
facts, the supreme court reversed the trial court's finding and dismissed the complaint.
Although this article does not review damages, it is significant
to note that an award of $7,676.96 to a father and $12,500 to a mother, both of whom had a life expectancy of 20 years, for wrongful
death of their well educated, well trained daughter, who was a
senior at Colorado University at the time of the accident, was not
excessive in the case of Stevens v. Strauss.56 In Thompson v. Gurule,5 7 the court held that an award of $250 to a mother and $100 to
a minor daughter for bruises, abrasion and shock sustained when
they were thrown about in an automobile was not excessive.
Numerous cases were decided with respect to proof necessary
to sustain a jury verdict and the propriety of submitting questions
to a jury.58
54 363 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1961).
55 366 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1961).
56 364 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1961).
57 360 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1961).
58 Frank v. Whinery, 366 P.2d 560 (Colo. 1961) (whether plaintiff stopped for a red light, whether
orthopedic devices interfered with her ability to drive ond whether defendant gave turn signal);
Smith v. Eichheim, 363 P.2d 185 (Colo. 1961) (whether loss of former's wheat crops were proximately caused by operation of neighbor's harvesting equipment); Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v.
Williams, 367 P.2d 342 (Colo. 1961) (whether railroad was negligent in grade crossing collision);
Lasnetske v. Parres, 365 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1961) (whether left turning motorist or oncoming 'motorist
in the intersection automobile collision was negligent or contributorily negligent); Thompson v. Gurule, 360 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1961) (whether defendant was negligent in driving his automobile with.
out its headlights); Bobo v. Logan, 358 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1961) (whether evidence was sufficient to
establish wilful and wanton acts which would take the case from under the protection of the guest
statute).
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BOOK REVIEW
MY LIFE IN COURT. By Louis Nizer. New York: Doubleday &
Co., 1961. Pp. 524. $5.95.
There are probably other lawyers with the legal acumen of
Louis Nizer pleading in a courtroom, but few can write with such
literary flair, such a gift for the bon mot, and such grace.
In this recital of his experiences in nine cases in various courts,
Mr. Nizer favors the reader with his own penchant for studious
preparation, undivided concentration, and imperturbable cocksureness.
He insists that no play or movie of a trial has ever equalled
the dramatic excitement, the electric atmosphere, of a real contest
before the Bar. If it be so, lawyers must be superb actors and men
of strong constitutions to survive.
Two cases are about libel suits. It is difficult to win such a
suit, he says, and even more difficult to gain any significant award
of damages. In the trial initiated by Quentin Reynolds against Westbrook Pegler, the plaintiff won $1.00 in compensatory damages,
and $175,000 in punitive damages, which is all to the good, since
punitive damages are not taxable. (Mr. Reynolds told me, on his
recent visit to Denver, that the trial cost $100,000 to prepare.)
Among the libelous statements which Mr. Pegler put into his
column attacking Mr. Reynolds, was one that Reynolds practiced
nudism. Nizer's rebuttal was classic-that Reynolds had such sensitive skin that any exposure to sunshine was a serious danger to
his health. Another libel was that Reynolds proposed marriage to
the widow of Heywood Broun in the funeral car on the way to
Broun's burial. The refutation consisted of showing that along with
them in the car were Monsignor Fulton Sheen and Heywood
Broun's son, hardly a cozy tete-a-tete for a marriage proposal. To
counter the charge by Pegler that Reynolds was cowardly, Nizer
went to England and brought attestations from the highest authorities in British military and political life about the courage Reynolds
had shown under fire.
In the case of Professor Friedrich Foerster against Victor
Ridder, Nizer succeeded in tearing away the mask of liberalism
and American patriotism from the defendant Ridder, and exposing
him as a collaborator with the Nazis, despite the apparent facade
of respectability enjoyed by Ridder from his association with Governor Herbert Lehman, Rabbi Stephen Wise, the Catholic hierarchy
and others.
In one of the three divorce suits described in rather unsavory
detail, the author tells of the case of John Jacob Astor whose diverse
divorce actions in various jurisdictions brought about the apparent
anomaly of holding that Astor was legally married to two different
women simultaneously, without being guilty of bigamy-the one
marriage valid only in New York, the other only in Florida.
He describes a plagiarism suit over a popular song in which
he represented the plaintiff, and found himself forced to contest
the supposed expertise of one of the foremost musicologists of
America, Dr. Sigmund Spaeth. Yet painstakingly Nizer whittled
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away at the competence of the expert and gained a verdict for his
client.
I would guess that lawyers would find most interest in two
cases of personal injury. One involved the death of a parturient
mother, in which Nizer sued the doctor civilly for malpractice and
negligence in not delivering the woman by Caesarian section. In
his zeal, the lawyer spoke in summation of "criminal negligence,"
and this apparently oversold his case. A hung jury resulted and,
on inquiring from the jurors, Nizer discovered that they had feared
to find for his client lest the doctor be subjected to criminal proceedings afterwards, just because he had used that unfortunate
adjective.
The other contest dealt with the death of a thirty year old
husband and father in a railroad accident. The writer represented
the widow and developed his case by projecting the life span of the
victim and the widow according to the latest actuarial tables,
despite the reluctance of the court to accept any but long established tables of life expectancy. Nizer also used some psychological
tests taken some time before the accident by the deceased as a
basis for demonstrating superior abilities which, given a normal
life duration, would have brought him and his family ever higher
monetary rewards which the accident cut short. Apparently his
daring presentation affected the railroad company, because they
settled out of court for four and a half times their original offer.
In what must have been one of his most trying cases, Mr. Nizer
describes the proxy battle for the control of Loew's. In the many
complicated developments of this titantic struggle he found himself
arguing in a Delaware court against the precedent seemingly established by the presiding judge himself. Can a minority of a Board of
Directors, who do not constitute a quorum, act to select sufficient
other members to the Board so as to constitute a quorum and
proceed with the business of the corporation? In the Chelsea Exchange case, the Chancery Court of Delaware had ruled that where
no quorum existed the minority might expand its numbers and
then proceed to act. On the face of it this position was adverse to
the side which Nizer represented. But, argued the lawyer, this
ruling only applies where the quorum was made impossible because
of death or resignation of the other members of the Board. In the
Loew case there was a sufficient number of directors alive and
able to attend if they chose to, so that no such contingency existed
which could permit the minority to constitute itself an acting
group, and to select other directors. This argument prevailed and
was one of the turning points of the entire series of actions that
resulted finally in vindicating Nizer's client, the management of
the corporation.
This is a fascinating book. It is not to be wondered at that it
has headed the best-seller list for so many weeks. Legal action
has a great fascination for all people, and when it is described with
Mr. Nizer's melodramatic flair, it is truly exciting.
Dr. Manuel Laderman*
*
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